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Abstract 
 
Islamist movements have traditionally been analyzed on the basis of their goal of establishing 
an Islamic State. But how should these movements be understood when this seemingly 
fundamental goal is abandoned? 
The following is a study of the Lebanese Hizballah, where I pursue a hypothesis that the aim 
of this party is to get a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. By studying different components of 
the Shiite Lebanese society; a local community in South Lebanon, the religious leader 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Hizballah itself, and their Shiite critics, I argue that this party 
has managed to get a hegemony over the Shiite community. Through this hegemony 
Hizballah has managed to become the dominant political force in Lebanon, and is thus able to 
control the direction of national politics as well. 
 
 
 
V 
 
 
 
VI 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to start by thanking my supervisors, Associate Professor Kjetil Selvik and 
Professor Gunvor Mejdell. I am deeply grateful for all their kind advices and the 
encouragement they gave me through the work with this thesis. The feedback offered me by 
Selvik was invaluable, I am very grateful! 
Further I would like to thank Associate Professor Bjørn Olav Utvik, for whom I have worked 
as Research Assistant for the past three years. His insights and encouragement have been 
invaluable, and it has been an unprecedented pleasure and honor to work for him. In this 
respect I would also like to thank Dr. Tilde Rosmer and Truls Hallberg-Tønnessen for their 
comments and for three fantastic years on the Fault Lines of Islamism project. 
I would also like to take the opportunity to thank all my teachers and colleagues at IKOS, not 
least Mary Moubarak, whose advice and company both here and in Lebanon have been great! 
I would also like to thank my colleague Jon Nordenson for all his feedback and help; it has 
been an honor to work with him. And I would also like to thank Monica Lund Haugom for all 
the assistance through the years. 
Ingrid Baltzersen has always had valuable comments and advices, I am very grateful. 
I would also like to thank numerous friends and fellow students for listening to my endless 
talks on the subject through the years. 
I would  like to thank all those in Mabarrat and in Khiam for receiving me and making my 
fieldwork possible, not least Shaykh Mahmoud Jalloul. I am very grateful for the unique 
opportunities he offered me, and not least for arranging my meetings with the late 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, may he rest in peace. 
I am also deeply grateful for all help, advice,  and company offered me by friends in Beirut, 
not least bi l-bayt. I love you all! 
Finally, I am extremely grateful for all the encouragement and help offered me by my mother 
and father over the years. Without this, I would never have managed to complete this thesis! 
VII 
 
 
VIII 
 
Notes on transliteration 
 
I have chosen to employ the transliteration used by the International Journal of Middle East 
Studies: 
 
ء   ʾ   
ب   b 
ت   t 
ث   th 
ج   j 
ح   ḥ 
خ   kh 
د   d 
ذ   dh 
ر   r 
ز   z 
س   s 
ش   sh 
ص   ṣ 
ض   ḍ 
ط   ṭ 
ظ   ẓ    
ع   ʿ 
غ   gh 
ف   f 
ق   q 
IX 
 
ك   k 
ل   l 
م   m 
ن   n 
ه   h 
و   w 
ى  y  
ة   a, in the construction -at 
لا   al- 
 
The long vowels are transliterated as follows: 
ى  ā 
ي  ī 
و  ū 
 
Doubled:                                                                 Diphthongs:                       Short vowels:      
 ّي  iyy, with final form ī                                          َي  ay                                    a,u,i 
 ّو   uww, with final form ū                                       َو  aw 
 
The Hamzat al-waṣl is not written. 
 
For names of persons I have given the name in full transliteration in square brackets the first 
time the name is mentioned, thereafter only the common English spelling is used. Names are 
always given with the capital letter first, for example Fadlallah [Faḍl Allāh]. In cases where 
there is no common English spelling, such as al-Khūʿī, I have chosen to use the Arabic 
transliteration. The same is done for some specific terms for which it is difficult to give a 
simple English translation.  
Topographs are written as they appear on signs in Latin script in Lebanon. 
X 
 
As for the transliteration of words in sequence, I have chosen to transliterate all words in 
pausal modus. All transliterations are italicized. The first letter in a sentence is written with a 
capital letter. 
Translations from Arabic or Norwegian are mine. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Islamists and their relation to the ideal of an Islamic state is a subject which occupies 
researchers in the field and is increasingly the subject of debate. This is not least due to the 
fact that few  Islamists have actually managed to achieve the goal of erecting an Islamic State. 
For some this is taken as a sign that political Islam has failed1, but  others argue that instead of 
focusing only on the state, one should appreciate these movements ability to reposition 
themselves and adjust to the developments taking place in their respective countries. A trend 
has emerged where Islamist movements are increasingly analyzed on the basis of other 
features than that of their intent to establish an Islamic state, one of these being to pursue a 
strategy of (re-) Islamization of the society.2 
This work continues along this line of analysis by studying the case of the Lebanese Hizballah 
[Ḥizb Allāh] and the strategy it uses to advance its ideas. Hizballah has puzzled and 
fascinated scholars and observers of Islamism and of Lebanese politics since its inception in 
the early eighties and to date. The movement started out as different groups with two 
important views in common; they were all deeply inspired by and supportive of the Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Khomeini [al-Khumaynī], and they were determined to 
put an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. When the party declared its existence 
officially in 1985, with the so-called ‘Open Letter to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and on 
Earth’, it also made it clear that it was following the guidance of Khomeini and declared its 
final goal to be the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon. 
However, following the end of the civil war in Lebanon in 1990, the party was faced with a 
major dilemma. Should they join the emerging post-war regime, which included other 
political forces they had sworn to annihilate, or should they remain on the outside of the new 
political order and pursue their goals from there? They had opposed the agreement that ended 
the war, the Taif Agreement, but at the same time they were under considerable pressure to 
lay down their arms and join the other political factions and parties in the new political order. 
Not least, the Syrians put considerable pressure on them to conform to the new order, as they 
were now in control over domestic Lebanese affairs, both politically and militarily. 
                                               
1
 Roy, Olivier (1994): The Failure of Political Islam Cambridge, Massaccusetts: Harvard University Press 
2
  Ismail p.160-176 
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As it turned out, an agreement seems to have been stuck between the Syrians and Hizballah: 
the party was allowed to keep its weapons as they were now considered to be a resistance 
movement tasked with liberating Lebanese soil on behalf of the Lebanese state, while on the 
other hand Hizballah was prevented from hampering the Syrian-controlled post-war regime. 
Nevertheless, the decision about whether to join the new political order was a difficult one for 
the party and after lengthy internal deliberations they were still not able to reach agreement on 
this question. A majority of its leadership favoured participation, while a minority, led by its 
first secretary-general Subhi Tufayli [Ṣubḥī al-Ṭufaylī] strongly opposed this. The solution 
came only after referring the case to Ali Khamenei [ʿAlī Khāminaʾī], the heir to Khomeini, 
who gave his blessing to participation, and the party consequently took part in the 
parliamentary elections of 1992. 
At the same time, and in response to these developments, Hizballah declared that it 
abandoned its goal of establishing an Islamic State in Lebanon, and claimed that this would 
now only be retained as an ideological project. This challenges a common definition of 
Islamism as being parties and movements seeking to bring the state itself in conformity with 
Islamic principles.3 The research question of the thesis is as follows: How should one 
understand the goals and strategies of an Islamist movement such as Hizballah when it has 
publicly disavowed the goal of building and Islamic State? While Hizballah is now a part of 
the Lebanese parliamentarian system, the Party continues to insist on keeping its weapons 
outside the realm of the Lebanese State. How can we make sense of this apparent paradox? 
In order to answer these questions, I pose the hypothesis that the aim of Hizballah is to seek a 
hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. This would allow the Party to retain the goal of setting up an 
Islamic State as a project for the future, while working through different strategies to prepare 
the ground for this future state.  Such a hegemony would give it the opportunity to prevent 
Lebanon from becoming a part of a Western backed Arab alliance, thus allowing the Islamic 
Resistance to continue its armed fight against Israel. 
 
 
1.1 The structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2 situates this thesis within a theoretical framework, and presents my approach for 
analysing Hizballah, while chapter 3 outlines the methodology I have employed. 
Chapter 4 of this thesis acts as  a brief introduction to Lebanon and its recent history, to 
Shiites and their history in Lebanon in particular, and it also includes a section on what is 
often referred to sectarianism, which plays such an important role in Lebanese politics, and in 
conjunction with this, it includes an overview of the sectarian-based parliamentarian system. 
Chapter 5 deals with the southern town of Khiam, where I did my fieldwork, and the question 
of who the different inhabitants I met there, not least the ones employed in Grand Ayatollah 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah [Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍl Allāh]'s organization, view as the 
providers of security in their daily lives, and how they look at the Lebanese state and their 
place in it. 
Chapters 6 and 7 handle Shiite politics on a national level, with a focus on the policies of 
Hizballah and Fadlallah respectively – how these view their role in the Lebanese state, and 
which concerns govern their policies. I demonstrate how these conform to the theory of 
hegemony that I outlined in the introduction, and discuss how this conforms to the findings I 
made during my fieldwork. Amal, the other Shiite party, is dealt with in chapter 8. 
Chapter 9 is devoted to the Shiite critics of the present policies of Hizballah and its allies, 
what their main concerns are and the policies against which they focus their criticism, and 
how they view the role of Shiites in the Lebanese state, as opposed to the role envisioned for 
them by Hizballah. 
In chapter 10, the final chapter, I sum up with my findings, and give an overview of where 
Shiite Lebanese politics are today.  
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2 Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Previous research on Hizballah 
In the years that followed the parliamentary elections of 1992, several scholars published 
books about Hizballah, and a dominant trend established itself in trying to explain its apparent 
shift in policy. A majority of scholars saw the change as a genuine shift in the party’s 
ideology, a transformation from a revolutionary, Khomeiniist movement to a more or less 
regular political party. What these scholars had in common is that they wrote in English, with 
a few exceptions, but based their studies mainly on Arabic sources. On the other hand, there 
were a few scholars who did not see such a shift in Hizballah’s policy, but rather an attempt to 
confront a new reality without changing the basic ideology or goals, only the modus operandi.  
 
2.2 A regular political party? 
The dominant trend is represented by Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, who in her book Hizbu’llah: 
Politics and Religion aims at analysing Hizballah’s policies in view of their intellectual 
‘pillars’. Participation in the elections in 1992 is seen by Saad-Ghorayeb as the culmination of 
the party’s ‘Lebanization’, or openness (infitāḥ) policy, and an integration into the democratic 
political system.4 While admitting that democracy is not one of the ‘intellectual pillars’5 of the 
party, and that the party considers Islam to represent ‘an ideal system capable of fulfilling 
absolute justice’,6 she still considers the party to have embraced democracy. She writes that 
‘…although Hizb’ullah does not endorse democracy as the best system of governance on the 
intellectual level, it endorses it as a system of governance on the political level’.7 Saad-
Ghorayeb makes a distinction between the intellectual and political dimensions in Hizballah’s 
discourse when she tries to explain the seeming inconsistency of embracing parliamentarian 
democracy on the one hand and an Islamic state on the other. Because the party has stated on 
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5
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6
 Ibid.  
7
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several occasions that it will not use force to install an Islamic republic, and due to their 
rhetoric on the concepts of justice and public freedoms, she sees their commitment to 
democracy as genuine. She acknowledges, however, that there are problems with this logic, as 
she writes on the very last page of her book, it is ‘…a marriage between the intellectual and 
the political which cannot persist indefinitely’.8 
Another scholar who has taken much the same approach is Joseph Alagha, who argues that 
there has been a genuine shift in the party’s ideology over the years. Like Saad-Ghorayeb, he 
makes a distinction between the religious and the political spheres, and he also considers 
participation in elections as a sign of the party’s new infitāḥ policy, or ‘Lebanization’.9 This 
shift is seen in connection with the changes which occurred in the leadership of the party at 
the time, when Abbas al-Moussawi [ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī] was elected as its second Secretary-
General. His predecessor Subhi Tufayli is by both authors seen as representing a more 
uncompromising view concerning participation in the elections of 1992.10 Alagha states in his 
conclusion that he considers the party to be an Islamic movement, writing that ‘…it displays, 
more and more, the characteristics of a nationalist-patriotic pursuing realpolitik (al-wāqiʿiyya 
al-siyāsiyya) when and if this is required by the circumstances’.11 Again it seems possible to 
detect the same duality as for the question of democracy: it is not profoundly embraced by the 
party and adopted as an ideological pillar, but rather dictated by the ‘circumstances’. Alagha 
is obviously aware of this himself, as he continues, ‘…Hizbullah conferred a de facto 
recognition of the Lebanese state, but not a de jure one. In other words, Hizbullah’s adherence 
to democratic principles and politics is not based on political-ideological grounds since its 
political ideology anathematized the Lebanese political system, rather on advancing interests 
(al-maṣāliḥ) and warding off vices (al-mafāsid)’.12  
Furthermore, he sees two main shifts in the party’s policies. First, their policies have become 
state-centered, to the degree that they are now involved in law-making, and second, the role of 
al-walī al-faqīh (Khamenei) is diminishing. Concerning the last point, he writes that 
‘Hizbullah took the decision and legitimized its participation in democratic processes by 
recourse to jurisprudential maxims and principles made by legislators such as Muhammad 
Raʿd, common Muslims such as Bilal Naʿim, and leaders of Muslim opinion such as Shaykh 
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 Ibid. p.191. 
9
 Alagha p.150-5. 
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 Saad-Ghorayeb p.47 and Alagha p.208. 
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 Alagha p.204. 
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 Ibid. 
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ʿAfif al-Nablusi.’13 It is worth noting here that he completely omits the pivotal role played by 
Khamenei, the reigning faqīh, even though earlier in his book he writes that ‘…Hizbullah 
presented its findings [on participating in the elections] to Imam Khamina`i and requested 
from him a formal legal opinion (istifta`)’.14 Only after this was secured did the party 
announce its decision to participate in these elections, not after obtaining the opinion of Mr. 
Naʿīm! 
Another of these books is the study by Judith Palmer Harik called Hezbollah: The Changing 
Face of Terrorism. It is different from the two studies mentioned above in two respects. First, 
she relies overwhelmingly on English-language sources, and second, it targets a mainly 
American audience, because the main argument is that Hizballah is not necessarily just a 
terrorist organization, and should no longer be classified as such by American authorities, but 
also a resistance movement with a legitimate right to resist the Israeli occupation of southern 
Lebanon.15  Following the other studies, she argues that participation in the elections in 1992 
represents ‘…a clear signal that it had changed its radical course and was abiding by the time-
honored rules of Lebanon’s electoral game’. She goes on to state that these elections 
‘…enhanced the Party of God’s legitimacy as a mainstream political party with a resistance 
wing …’.16 
The main achievement of her study, as I see it, is that she clearly explains what she dubs the 
‘two-track strategy’ of the Syrians, which is supporting Hizballah and its Islamic Resistance 
on the one hand, while on the other hand also supporting the Lebanese state and its 
institutions. The essence of this deal is: Hizballah would have to put aside its aspirations to 
establish an Islamic republic in Lebanon, ‘soft-pedal’ its radical ideology and join the post-
war, Syrian-controlled political regime as a part of the ‘loyal opposition’; the Lebanese 
authorities would, in turn bestow upon Hizballah the right to liberate occupied Lebanese 
territories on behalf of the Lebanese state, which would stay out of their way while they were 
undertaking this mission.17 The aim of the Syrians with this strategy, she argues, is to pressure 
the Israelis into negotiating the return of the Golan Heights. That this strategy has led to 
skirmishes and confrontations between the Lebanese state and Hizballah is also dealt with, 
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 Alagha p.155. 
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 Harik p.195. 
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 Ibid. p.52. 
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and particularly the problems that emerged between then-Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri 
[Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī] and the party.18 
There are other books on Hizballah in English as well, such as Hala Jabers Born with a 
Vengance and Augustus Richard Norton’s Hezbollah. The reason for not including these here 
is that they give an historic overview rather than having an aim of analysing the strategy or 
ideological foundation of the party. They both represent valuable contributions to our 
understanding of Hizballah but unlike those I have chosen to include here, they do not offer 
an argument in this or that direction. Another book which is not included here is Magnus 
Randstorp’s Hizb´Allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis. As the title 
implies, this book is focused on the taking of western hostages in Lebanon in the second half 
of the eighties and is as such outside the focus of this thesis. An additional reason for not 
including it is Randstorp’s contentious use of sources: for instance, he claims that Fadlallah 
was a member of the leadership of Hizballah and the source is given as an unattributable 
interview with a high-ranking Israeli military official; this is highly controversial to say the 
least. 
 
2.3 A different view 
The few scholars with a different approach to analysing the party and its policies have in 
common that they, to some extent, question the sincerity of the party’s abandonment of the 
ideal of an Islamic state. One of these is Nizar Hamzeh, whose study on Hizballah differs 
from others in that he focuses on the organizational structure of the party. Contrary to the 
three studies mentioned above, Hamzeh is very clear as to what he believes is Hizballah’s 
goal: the establishment of an Islamic state in Lebanon. Like others, he observes that this 
might not be possible in the imminent future but he claims that this is the goal that the party is 
working to realize, through various means. 
Participation in elections, which for other scholars represents a watershed in the history of the 
party and a sign of their commitment to working within the framework of the Lebanese 
political system, is in Hamzeh’s view seen as an opportunity for the party to secure increased 
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legitimacy and to protect its resistance.19 According to Hamzeh, the party’s view of 
democracy can be summoned up as ‘one man, one vote, once’20. In his reading of Hizballah’s 
religious ideology and their commitment to it, concepts such as democracy and human rights 
are not part of it, and ‘…God given Shari´ah cannot be replaced by such concepts, and shura 
[consultation] among Islamic leaders does not equal democracy’.21 
According to him, the party has succeeded in establishing what he calls an Islamic order in 
the parts of the country where they are in control.22 He views the different tactics employed 
by the party over the years as different modus operandi, subject to the changing conditions 
facing them, but the final goal as always the same: ‘…seizing political power and establishing 
a regime governed by the Shari´ah…’23 His analysis of Hizballah implies that the party is not 
sincere when it says that erecting an Islamic regime of some kind is confined to an 
‘ideological project’. 
Hamzeh is not the only scholar to take this approach and many of his readings and 
conclusions are echoed by Wadah Sharara [Waḍḍāḥ Sharāra] in his study of the party called 
The State of Hizballah: Lebanon an Islamic Society (Dawlat Ḥizb Allāh: Lubnān Mujtamaʿan 
ʾIslāmiyyan). Sharara’s study is different from that of the other scholars, as his is a 
sociological study with a focus on the increase in the number of ʿulamāʾ, religious scholars, 
among the Shiites of Lebanon, and their role in Islamizing the society from below. He 
documents how, starting from the mid-sixties and coinciding with the arrival of Fadlallah to 
Lebanon, religious education among Shiite Lebanese has spread in an unprecedented manner. 
An important point in this respect is how families with no previous record of religious 
learning joined the ranks of the ʿulamāʾ, and how he perceives this to be a conscious strategy 
on part of senior members of this class to build the basis for an Islamic society. He traces this 
to the arrival of Fadlallah and his setting up the Institute of the Islamic Sharia in what was 
then East Beirut, which immediately after he established it in 1966 started to educate men of 
religion (rijāl al-dīn). Sharara is among those who claim that Fadlallah had a pivotal role in 
the establishment of Hizballah. He even goes as far as claiming that it was he who issued the 
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infamous fatwa blessing the first of the party’s suicide operations, something Fadlallah 
himself has always denied.24  
Sharara argues that the goal of setting up an Islamic state in Lebanon has not changed, the 
difference being that instead of pushing openly for its implementation, and thus antagonizing 
large parts of Lebanese society, they have decided to let time work for them. As evidence for 
this he points to Naim Qasem [Naʿīm Qāsim], the Deputy Secretary-General of Hizballah, 
who in his book says that there is no room for the party to leave behind its commitment to 
erecting an Islamic state, and while he states that they will not use force to implement this, he 
writes they that will continue to call for this state through daʿwa, ‘proselytizing work’.25 
 
2.4 Other studies on the party in Arabic 
Of the many books on Hizballah published in Arabic which I have read, most follow the 
analysis of Saad-Ghorayeb and Alagha. As an example of these I have chosen the study made 
by Faḍīl ʾAbū Al-Naṣir published under the title Hizballah: Truths and Repercussions (Ḥizb 
Allāh: Haqāʾiq wa ʾabʿād). 
He argues that the party is a Lebanese party with a Lebanese agenda, and like Saad Ghorayeb 
and Alagha he uses participation in elections as a main argument in this respect. However, 
unlike these two, he points to several dilemmas facing the party in order to become ‘a 
Lebanese political party in all meanings of the word’26 and which he seems to admit are not 
resolved yet. One of these is the dilemma of legality. According to their religious beliefs, only 
a system based on wilāyat al-faqīh theory can be considered legitimate. Another dilemma for 
the party is that its commitment to this doctrine places it outside the framework of Lebanese 
politics (khārij al-luʿba al-siyāsiyya al-lubnāniyya). He also sees a conflict between the 
followers of Hizballah and the rest of the Lebanese public over the question of resistance, 
because after the Israeli withdrawal in 2000 the ‘ordinary Lebanese’ would not necessarily see 
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the need for resistance to liberate the still occupied Sheba farms, but rather favour a peaceful 
solution to this problem.27 
Another feature of this book, not uncommon in Lebanon, is that the author has included a 
number of ‘testimonies’, shahādāt, at the end of his book. The first part of these testimonies 
comes from different officials in the party, who comment on different aspects of the party’s 
policies, such as the nature of the party, their view on women, and Palestine. The other part of 
these testimonies consists of the views of different Lebanese scholars on Hizballah. Among 
those who have written such statements, by invitation of the author, are scholars such as 
Raḍwān al-Sayyid, Farīd al-Khazān and Nasīr al-ʾAsʿad.28 
The major problem with this study, in my view, is that dilemmas like those raised above are 
not discussed by the author, but left to be answered by the party itself through one of the 
many officials he interviewed for his book. An example of this can be found under the 
heading, ‘The most important particularities of the culture of the Hizballah man’, in which he 
leaves it to Shaykh Ḥasan Ḥamāda to draw up the picture of this ‘man’ and it is then left 
uncommented.29 
Abū al-Naṣir also devotes a chapter to what he dubs ‘the Society of the Resistance’, mujtamaʿ 
al-muqāwama. The society he describes here is a society of war and jihad, progressing from 
‘resisting the evil in the self’ and ‘reforming the human society’ to fighting the enemy, i.e. 
Israel, with weapons. According to him, there will be no peace before the relinquishment of 
the Jewish state, and this society of resistance is a prerequisite for the continued fight against 
the enemy. This society, even in peaceful times, lives in a condition of alert, ready for the 
next fight with the enemy. To uphold this society of resistance, an infrastructure to 
accommodate its various needs is necessary, and Abū al-Naṣir examines the various branches 
of this structure. These include different organizations and foundations belonging to the party, 
such as the Jihād al-Bināʾ, whose role is far broader that that of being a mere (re)construction 
company; they are also involved in such areas as agriculture, electricity and dealing with 
unemployment. Another of these institutions is the chain of schools run by the party in the 
south, Beirut and the Bekaa called al-Mahdī, and then there are the different branches of their 
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information unit, like the TV station al-Manār, the radio station al-Nūr and the newspaper al-
ʿAhd.30  
 
2.5 The need for a new perspective 
How do the proponents of the view that Hizballah has become a regular Lebanese party 
explain the insistence on part of Hizballah to cling on to their weapons and continue their 
fight against Israel from outside the Lebanese state? One should bear in mind here that the 
Islamic Resistance is, according to Hizballah itself, their number one priority, to which all 
other priorities are subsumed. The answer to the question posed above is that they are not able 
to explain this. They all agree that the resistance is the number one priority of the party, but 
none of them perceive the problem to any great extent in the inherent conflict for a country to 
have two armed forces, only one of which is under the control of the state. Their studies are 
written after the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon in 2000, so they have had the 
possibility of examining statements made by Hizballah about the future of its resistance, yet 
they seem unable to explain the party keeping its arms and not submitting them to the control 
of the Lebanese state, whose political system these scholars claim the party is actively 
engaged in and accepts.  
On the other hand, how do the researchers who claim that the goal of establishing an Islamic 
state continues to be Hizballah’s main aim, explain recent developments such as the alliance 
with a leading Christian politician? Should the statement that the goal of establishing an 
Islamic state has been abandoned, be viewed as a lie? 
Given that none of these studies offers an analysis of the Party which can explain the 
seemingly inconsistency of being both a political party and an army, nor explain the size and 
extension of the Party’s various branches, I will suggest an analysis based on the hypothesis 
that the aim of Hizballah is to exert a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. 
As I wrote above in the introduction, Islamist movements are often defined and analysed on 
the basis that they strive to achieve an Islamic state, whether through overthrowing a regime 
and replacing it with an Islamic one, or through reforms aimed at bringing the state in 
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conformity with what is perceived to be Islamic principles. I suggest moving away from the 
paradigm of the Islamic state and instead using the concept of hegemony when analysing 
these movements. This would, in my view, offer a more precise assessment of the strategies 
and goals of these movements. The following, a case study of Hizballah, is therefore 
presented as one example of these movements. 
I argue that this approach allows for a more complete picture of Hizballah to emerge, and 
thereby broadens our understanding of the party, its choice of strategy and its goals. It will 
help to explain why the party has chosen to cling on to their arms, while at the same time 
joining the Lebanese political system. By examining different components of Shiite Lebanon, 
from the inhabitants of a southern town, via a religious authority such as Fadlallah to 
Hizballah itself, I hope to show how these relate to each other and how they operate within 
the same framework.  
I will also present Shiite critics of Hizballah. Through this I hope to show that there are other 
voices to be heard as well. It is of great value when examining the policies of the party to lend 
an ear to those who criticize them from a religious point of view, and assess how the party 
reacts to this criticism. This will hopefully also contribute to a more profound understanding 
of the nature of the motives behind their chosen strategies. 
While this is a case study of Hizballah, this study will hopefully encourage a broader 
approach towards the study of other Islamist movements as well. Shifting the focus from the 
ideal of an Islamic state to that of seeking hegemony, not least over civil society, will 
hopefully contribute to a deeper understanding of these movements and their choice of 
strategy.  
 
2.6 Hegemony 
Hegemony is a concept commonly taken to mean the dominance of one group over others, be 
it a state over other states or non-state actors over other non-state actors, or the dominance 
within one state of a given group over others. It is, however, necessary to analyse and define 
this concept in more detail before it can be used to describe the processes which Hizballah has 
instigated, and continues to employ, in Shiite Lebanon.  
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The concept of hegemony as it is used here owes a great deal to the Marxist philosopher 
Antonio Gramsci. It should be noted that his – and others’ – contributions to this field are 
linked to their desire to wrest the control of the state from capitalists, and for the working 
class to take over the state apparatus. However, one of the main motives for the development 
of the concept of hegemony was his desire to attempt to analyse how and why the ruling 
classes in Europe at the time were so successful in retaining power.31 This analysis was 
clearly undertaken with the aim of learning from that experience, so that the working class 
would be able to construct their own hegemony and thus take control of the state. 
To further our understanding of hegemony, the following statement gives an idea of how the 
concept is understood in Marxism: ‘The concept of hegemony is not a value-neutral term 
within a positivistic social science. Rather in Gramsci’s work, the concept of hegemony is 
linked with a complex set of claims about what could be a coherent viewpoint of the world. In 
this perspective, only a coherent world-view, a well rounded philosophy and related morality, 
could be hegemonic.’32 This is to indicate that when discussing hegemony, we are dealing 
with a concept which implies much more than just domination, by force or otherwise, of one 
group over others. Rather there is a complex of several factors which needs to be in place 
before we can talk about a hegemony.  
Bocock identifies three intertwined yet separate spheres forming the baseline for the 
conceptualization of hegemony: the economic sphere, the state and civil society.33 The first, 
the economic sphere, was the traditional focus of Marxists, and deals with the ownership of 
the means of production. Control over these were seen as the prerequisite for change, i.e. only 
after taking over the means of production could the working class establish the socialist state. 
The state sphere includes the control over the means of violence within a given territory such 
as the police and armed forces but also the state-funded bureaucracies like the civil service, 
legal, welfare and educational institutions. The third sphere, civil society, consists of other 
organizations that are not part of the two abovementioned spheres; they are supported and run 
by people not belonging to those spheres. Examples would include various religious 
institutions and the media.  
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The borders between these three spheres are not constant but could change, and groups and 
organizations could in fact belong to more than one of them.  
Gramsci went from the traditional Marxist focus of control over the means of production (in 
order for the working class to take over the state and change the society) to emphasizing the 
role of ideology and the role of civil society in gaining hegemony. To acquire hegemony was 
seen by him as a prerequisite for taking over the state itself,34 the final goal of the Marxist 
party he led, and naturally of other Marxist parties.  He clearly saw an important role for 
intellectuals in this process, to educate the masses and to get them to accept the hegemony of 
a certain class or group over society. He sees the intellectuals as the ‘element which gives a 
class its homogeneity and consciousness, which is the element that organizes a class as a 
social force, and connects this class with the remainder of the population in an “historic 
block” or in a given social unity’.35 
Gramsci also emphasized that a class seeking hegemony seeks to present its interests as 
common interests, rather than that of its own narrow economic or corporative interests,36 or at 
least seeks to ensure that these interests do not conflict with those of its allies and partners. 
The clearer the ideological foundation of a group that seeks to gain hegemony over others, the 
more likely it is to succeed, given that it is able, through its intellectuals, to create an 
understanding for and an acceptance of the hegemony in question. This consent needs to be 
organized, and here intellectuals are a prerequisite, for they become the connection between 
leaders and the population.37 
The control and use of a repressive apparatus alone would not be sufficient to uphold a 
hegemony, it would also demand the consent of a majority in order to succeed. The more a 
group resorts to violence and repression in order to secure its hegemony, the weaker this 
hegemony will be, and the opposite as well is true – the less violence and the greater the 
voluntary acceptance and consent on part of a majority of the population, the stronger the 
hegemony. Ideally a class or a group’s dominance or hegemony should be accepted as an 
historical necessity. Optimal success is achieved when the ideas of the rulers come to be seen 
as the norm, as universal ideologies. 
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There is, however, a need to keep at bay other forces that might challenge the hegemony of a 
given group. The aim would be to marginalize the influence of these groups in society. This 
can be done in several ways. Some groups could easily be co-opted, ideologically or 
economically, while others could be met with physical resistance to curb their influence on 
the population at large.  
To sum up: the concept of hegemony, as I will use it in this paper, should be viewed as a few 
different, yet intertwined hegemonies, or fields of domination: the economic sphere, the state 
(which includes the military) and civil society. The main focus of this specific thesis will be 
on what we might call civil society, that is, the non-state actors operating within the Shiite 
Lebanese societies.  
I will not enter into the contested area of what constitutes civil society, for several reasons. 
Given that the focus of this thesis is on hegemony, I will adopt the maximalist definition of 
civil society as being groups and organizations of a wide variety, the common marker being 
that they are voluntary civic and social organizations and institutions that form the basis of a 
functioning society, as opposed to the force-backed structures of a state (regardless of that 
state's political system) or the commercial institutions of the market. This is not to ignore that 
in practice the boundaries between these three spheres are blurred and negotiable. Gramsci 
writes about two levels, one he refers to as ‘the political society’ or the state, and the other as 
‘the citizen’s society (società civile)’, the totality of those organisms that in common speech 
are referred to as civil.38 As I have mentioned above, this latter sphere was singled out by 
Gramsci as being of paramount importance for a group wishing to establish a hegemony, as 
this is where the battle over the population’s hearts and minds are fought. This is not to say 
that the economic sphere or the state, with its repressive apparatus, is not important, but as I 
will argue in the thesis, due to the history of the area in question (Lebanon) and the facts on 
the ground, these two spheres came to play a minor role compared to that of civil society, 
therefore that is what I will focus on in this thesis. 
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3 Methodology 
 
3.1 A case study 
In order for the hypothesis thatHizballah has been seeking s a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon 
as posed above to be valid,  there are certain conditions which needs to be fulfilled. One of 
these is a strong ideological foundation, and through this, the ability to make its policies be 
viewed as identical with the common interests of the Shiite community. This would have to 
be achieved with a minimal use of force.   To pursue this agrument, I have divided the case 
into four sub cases. These are studies of (1) a local, Shiite community, (2) Hizballah on a 
national level, (3) the role of Fadlallah and (4) Shiite critics of Hizballah.  
As the hypothesis relates to how the Shiites themselves perceive the role of Hizballah and 
who they see as their protectors and representatives – in addition to the question of whom 
they refer to for religious guidance – a close study of the Shiite community is inevitable. I 
therefore opted for a study of a single Shia community, which could serve as an example of 
the Shiite community as a whole. This kind of case study, where the purpose of the study is to 
further an understanding of the views of Lebanese Shiites in general, is often referred to as an 
instrumental case study.39 By studying a particular community, or an organization for that 
matter, in greater detail, one should be able to obtain a deeper understanding of the greater 
community.  
One of the great advantages of a case study is that the approach is well suited to generating 
hypothesizes,40 which is what I undertake in this study. When I began my fieldwork I was 
quite uncertain about what I would find in the relations between a local Shiite community and 
the larger Lebanese Shiite community, and its relations with the Lebanese state. My findings 
led me to the concept that Hizballah seeks to exercise a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon, 
which is the thesis for which I will argue. That is not to say that my aim is to test or to 
validate this hypothesis. In order to test a hypothesis, a larger cross-case study will have to be 
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undertaken, because a single study such as this one would not offer enough evidence to 
validate it.  
What I try to do here is look at the strategy of Hizballah from a new perspective. As far as I 
am aware, no-one has argued that seeking hegemony over Shiite Lebanon is the aim of the 
party.  
 
3.1.1 Fieldwork 
The thesis is based on a fieldwork in the southern town of Khiam which I completed in the 
autumn of 2008 and it took place thanks to the Mabarrat (Jamʿiyyat al-Mabarrāt al-
Khayriyya) foundation, the charitable foundation of Grand Ayatollah Fadlallah. Initially I 
wanted to do my fieldwork with the party itself, but found this to be difficult, if not 
impossible, given what was referred to as the security situation in the area, and given that this 
is a very sensitive area for Hizballah, as quickly became clear. I then approached a cleric 
working with Fadlallah, told him about my intention to explore the relations between the 
Shiites of a southern village or town and the Lebanese state. Given that Fadlallah himself has 
put an emphasis on the fact that he considers Hizballah and himself to be part of the same 
Islamic milieu (ḥālaʾ islāmiyya), I asked him about the possibility of conducting my 
fieldwork with Fadlallah’s organization instead.  He immediately welcomed my request, and 
facilitated me with all the necessary contacts. I was then given the choice of conducting the 
fieldwork in either Khiam or Bint Jbeil. Mabarrat, as well as Fadlallah’s religious 
organization, have a considerable presence in both towns but given that Bint Jbeil is much 
larger that Khiam, I choose Khiam as my example of a Shiite town in the south of Lebanon. 
All the conversations during the fieldwork were conducted in colloquial Arabic. 
 
3.1.2 Limitations and obstacles 
Doing fieldwork in the south of Lebanon poses a series of obstacles. The first is access to the 
area itself. Any foreigner who wishes to travel south of the Litani River has to obtain a special 
permit (taṣrīḥ) from the bureau of intelligence of the Lebanese Army in Sidon. How easy this 
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is can vary, but since I was accompanied by a Mabbarat employee who could vouch for me, 
and since I was not a journalist, it went quite easily. 
A second problem which I encountered was the limitation of movement. I could not freely 
move around town on my own, again due to the ever-recurring security situation. On my 
second day in town, my main source took me aside and told me that he had felt obliged to 
inform the responsible for security in town, al-masʾūl al-ʾamnī, about my presence there. Ḥajj 
S., the Hizballah official, gave his approval of my presence there on the following two 
conditions: I could not walk around alone – someone from the Mabbarat office would have to 
accompany me when I wanted to venture outside the office, and I could not stay the night in 
the town. 
These conditions of course limited my ability to talk to whoever I wanted, but on the other 
hand it had its advantages. My main source, an elderly man, was well-known and respected 
among the locals, and it seemed to me that no-one put any limitations on themselves when 
talking to me in his presence. This also protected me against potential accusations of being an 
Israeli spy – both before and after I did my fieldwork, there were endless reports about spies 
being apprehended, both foreign and local. Also, it gave me ample time to get to know the 
different people working with Fadlallah in Khiam and its surroundings. I would be taken 
along by the men in the office to meet representatives in surrounding villages and others they 
thought I should meet. During these trips we had some very interesting conversations, which 
in a special way helped me further understand how they viewed their situation.  
Last but not least, being prevented from staying in Khiam at night, I had the opportunity to 
get to know its neighbouring village Ibl al-Saqi, a mixed Druze and Christian village a few 
kilometers away. This village had for several years housed NORBATT, the Norwegian forces 
of UNIFIL, which were first deployed here in 1978. Initially, those I met there found it 
difficult to believe that I was indeed a Norwegian – due to my Lebanese dialect they thought I 
was Beiruti – but on my second visit to one of the local bar-cum-restaurants, that changed. 
The owner introduced me to a man who had worked as a translator for the Norwegian 
contingent there, who had himself visited Norway. After this I was treated like an old friend, 
and would spend every evening chatting with the owners and patrons of the bar. This gave me 
a unique insight into how they, non-Shiite southerners, perceived the current situation, which 
has been very useful for me in the work on this thesis. 
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3.2 A redesigned thesis 
Initially, I had wanted to limit this thesis to discovering who the Shiites in a southern town 
viewed as their providers of security, and how they related to the Lebanese state. However, 
when I returned to Norway and started to review this fieldwork, my findings led me to 
consider redesigning the thesis. This was not least due to some of the very blunt and 
surprising statements some of the people in Fadlallah’s organization had given me as to their 
views on the Lebanese state. However, it was also due to the opposing views expressed by 
others in the same organization, albeit in a much more secretive manner. Compared to 
Hizballah’s formal relinquishing of the goal of establishing an Islamic state in Lebanon, the 
question of how to understand the party’s policies came to the forefront. If the goal is no 
longer to take control of the state, what is it? At this stage, my supervisor also provided me 
with invaluable comments and suggestions, leading me the pose the question as to whether 
Hizballah exerts a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. 
It should be mentioned here that I had done some preparatory work for this thesis while on a 
visit to Lebanon in the summer of 2008, a very tense period for the country. I had then 
collected articles from a wide variety of newspapers, and thanks to the Palestine Studies 
Institute in Verdun I managed to obtain articles dealing with Hizballah and its development 
since the end of the civil war. Many of these had been used as sources by authors of the books 
on Hizballah whose analysis of the party I criticize in this thesis. 
On that same visit I had met and interviewed some Lebanese intellectuals who had themselves 
studied the party, among them Wadah Sharara. I also discussed my project with a wide range 
of friends, who gave me a fantastic feedback and many also provided me with articles and 
sources that I was to use later.  
 
3.2.1 From the local to the national 
Having decided to redesigned my thesis, and present the hypothesis that Hizballah is seeking 
to exercise a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon, I expanded my focus from Khiam to Shiite 
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Lebanon. By Shiite Lebanon I intend first and foremost the intellectual sphere where the 
different actors expresses their views, policies and power, not just the narrow confines of the 
geographical parts of Lebanon where the Shiites constitute a majority of the population. 
Would it be possible to observe the same trends on a national level as those I observed in 
Khiam?  
 
 
3.3 The sources 
3.3.1 The fieldwork 
As mentioned above, it is the fieldwork I did in Khiam which is the main basis of this thesis. 
Through this fieldwork, adopting a qualitative research approach, this case study should be 
able to illuminate trends and policies on a national level as well. 
One of the first concerns which confronted me was how to treat the people I met and talked 
with in the south, my sources. They range from shopkeepers and mechanics, their friends and 
other passers by, to the local staff at Fadlallah’s two offices in the town, his representatives in 
surrounding villages and their families. I quickly opted for anonymizing all of these people, 
save for one, the raʾīs al-baladiyya who I had the opportunity to interview and who spoke as 
an official, not as a private person. 
The main reason behind my decision to anonymize the remainder of people I met was they 
spoke to me as private persons, giving me their views and opinions on the situation in which 
they are living. Many would offer me views and opinions that surprised me, certainly going 
against the views expressed by officials, both party and religious. However, the same could be 
said about these officials as well. On some occasions I had to ask if I could cite them, as I was 
well aware that what they said was clearly contradicting the ‘official line’ of the organization 
or party to which they belonged. Even though they approved, I feel more comfortable with 
not exposing their identities, so as to protect them from being confronted by others with what 
they said to me. Then there were those who confidentially offered me views considered 
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controversial, and obviously in these cases I have chosen to actively make it difficult for 
anyone to identify them, by offering the merest amount of information about who they are. 
It should be noted that I am aware that anonymity is not the same as confidentiality, i.e. while 
confidentiality indicates an attempt to completely remove any possibility of recognizing the 
subject, anonymity is just to keep the subject nameless.41 I attempt here to go beyond just 
leaving out the names of those I spoke with, although sometimes this is difficult. The number 
of employees in Fadlallah’s organization in the town is limited, and with some knowledge of 
Khiam it would be possible to identify them. This does not pose a major problem as I see it, 
as I made it clear from the outset that I was researching an academic thesis, and that I would 
use the information they and others would provide me with for that purpose. They all 
approved of this; their main concern was to make sure that I was not a journalist of some 
kind. 
None of these conversations were recorded. I brought a tape recorder with me, but both due to 
prior advice and my own judgment, I found that recording my conversations would probably 
lead those I spoke with to not speak as freely as they did. Instead I opted for taking notes and 
every evening I would write down all the day’s events with as much detail as I could. 
(Actually, on one occasion when we were visiting a representative of Mabarrat in a village 
close to Khiam, one of the men from the office thought I took too few notes when talking to 
the representative’s father, so he whispered in my ear that I should write more, as it would 
make me look more serious!) 
 
3.3.2 Written sources 
In addition to the observations I made during my fieldwork, I have employed a number of 
other sources to illuminate the policies of Hizballah in particular and the larger Shiite scene in 
general. The written sources I have used in this thesis are mainly used to underpin the 
findings of my fieldwork. As the views that these texts display are in most cases very clear, I 
have chosen this informal approach when reading them.42 
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As for the written sources I have used, there are other potential problems, although I feel 
confident that I have managed to steer away from most of these.  
The main problem with some of these written sources is that they are biased on one side or the 
other, which in itself is not a problem as long as I remain aware of this. For instance, it is well 
known that the newspaper al-Nahār is firmly placed on one side of the political divide, with 
al-Safīr on the other, even though al-Nahār in particular has prominent writers who support 
the ‘other side’, so to speak. Other cases are more complicated. The magazine al-Shiraʿ is a 
good example of this. In the eighties, nineties, and into the 2000s the magazine was a staunch 
supporter of the Syrian regime and their presence in Lebanon but since the Syrian withdrawal 
in 2006 the magazine has adopted a vehemently anti-Syrian and anti-Hizballah stance. 
However, this does not disqualify al-Shiraʿ from being used as a source in certain instances. 
In the autumn of 2008, they ran a series of interviews with Fadlallah, some of which I have 
used. Still, I remember the reaction of one of the people working for Mabarrat when I told 
him about these interviews: ‘No Shia reads al-Shiraʿ!’ It should be mentioned that the 
magazine is owned by a Shia. 
 
3.3.3 Interviews 
I made a few interviews for the thesis as well. Among them are two with Fadlallah himself, 
the first conducted at the end of my fieldwork in 2008 and the second in the summer of 2009. 
In connection with the first of these, I also had a long and very illuminating talk with ḥajj 
Hani Abdallah [Hānī ʿAbd Allāh], his closest personal adviser. 
The other interviews I have used here are with Wadah Sharara and Saud al-Mawla [Saʿūd al-
Mawlā], who are both critics of Hizballah and their policies. Sharara and al-Mawla are 
academics at the Department of Sociology at the Lebanese University. I have also used 
articles they have written, and the book on Hizballah by Sharara, The State of Hizballah: 
Lebanon an Islamic Society (Dawlat Ḥizb Allāh: Lubnān Mujtamaʿan ʾIslāmiyyan). 
I have also used an interview I made with Yasir al-Manai [Yāsir al-Manaʿī], who is the head 
of the Qatari office for the reconstruction of south Lebanon. 
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All these interviews were recorded. The ones with Fadlallah were also filmed and I was 
subsequently given a copy of them. The reason for recording these interviews was mainly that 
they were quite long, which meant that I would have had difficulties in reflecting over and 
comprehending the answers if I had to write down all the answers. I had requested beforehand 
if I could use a recorder, and the request was immediately approved. 
Except for the interviews with Fadlallah, which were standardized interviews, the others 
would have to be described as semi-standardized.43 That is to say, I had some topics I wanted 
to enquire about, but not a set of questions I asked. I tried to formulate my questions in a way 
that would make it easy for those I interviewed to focus on what they deemed important, and 
not on what might have been my own presuppositions of what was important. 
The only interview I did in Khiam, with the raʾīs al-baladiyya, is the only one I did not 
record. I brought the recorder, but the atmosphere was so lively in the office that it did not 
seem appropriate. 
  
3.3.4 Other sources 
In addition, I have used speeches by Hasan Nasrallah and other leaders of the party as 
sources. Some of these I have on DVD, while on other occasions I have used transcripts of 
their speeches provided by party websites like those of al-Manār and al-Intiqād, the Hizballah 
TV station and weekly magazine respectively. I choose to use two one DVD as a source too: 
it is  from a series on Lebanese political parties produced by the TV station NTV, known for 
its affiliation with Nabih Berri [Nabīh Birrī] and the Amal movement. It deals with the history 
of Amal, and provides insight into how this party itself perceives recent Lebanese history, and 
how they would like to present itself to the Lebanese public. 
Last but not least, I have benefited enormously from endless discussions and talks with 
friends and acquaintances in Lebanon. They have provided me with other perspectives and 
views, and they have given me their perspective on Hizballah and its policies, and how these 
affect them in different ways.  
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3.4 Triangulation and Crystallization 
This use of different methodological techniques to get a deeper understanding of a case is 
often referred to as ‘triangulation’. Ideally, by employing different research techniques and 
thereby looking at a case from different angles, the researcher should be able to get a more 
complex and holistic picture of the real situation, and also be able to verify his or her 
findings.44 Others criticize the term triangulation and prefer this way of researching to be 
referred to as ‘crystallization’, the idea being that the researcher should look at the object 
from a multitude of angles, thus obtaining a ‘crystal’ with (a potential) multitude of shapes 
and substances, which can grow, change shape and be altered. This way of approaching the 
use of different methods in research, crystallization, is probably closer to describing what I 
have done in this thesis than triangulation, as the latter term would imply that there are three 
different techniques at work that will form a triangle, rather than a crystal. 
 
3.5 Objectivity 
A final note of great importance for this and any other thesis is the question of the researcher 
and his neutrality. In the same way the proponents of crystallization are eager to underline 
that there is no such thing as a single truth, I feel obliged to stress that there is no such thing 
as absolute neutrality. As a Norwegian, born and raised in a culture of egalitarianism, I am 
naturally coloured by this. Further, this thesis and the research preceding it is naturally 
influenced by the fact that I lived and studied in Lebanon for a period in the beginning of the 
nineties. Since then I visited the country regularly and I follow the political situation there on 
a daily basis, through my access to a variety of Lebanese and other Arab satellite channels, 
online newspapers and news websites, and through friends living there. Furthermore, this 
thesis could be seen as controversial, as I criticize an analysis of Hizballah that is common 
among scholars who have done research on the party.  
While having my views on the political situation in Lebanon, I have done my utmost to make 
this thesis as well-founded as possible, through different considerations. First, during my 
fieldwork I made it clear to everyone I spoke to that I was there to get their views on their 
own situation. I did not engage in discussions about their views, nor did I give any impression 
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as to my own inclinations, not in order to hide my views, but in order to obtain their views 
expressed freely, not as a defence or a justification. When conducting the fieldwork, I tried to 
be as open-minded and observant as possible. I did not have a pre-established idea of what 
results I would end up with. To my delight, I found many nuances, and also differing 
opinions, some of them unexpected, others conventional, and I have tried to include them all 
in the thesis. 
These same considerations are valid for the written material as well. This material consists of 
books, documents, articles and speeches by both supporters and opponents of the party. The 
largest part of this is in Arabic. I have done what I could to be true to the opinions these 
represent, both through translation and presentation.  
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4 The Lebanese state 
 
4.1 A contested entity 
Following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the great 
powers of the time, France and England, became directly involved in shaping the future of the 
Middle East. France took control of what later became Syria and Lebanon, while Great 
Britain controlled Palestine and (Trans-)Jordan. They did this officially as Mandate powers on 
behalf of the League of Nations, with independence for these territories being the goal of their 
Mandate. The French formed the Republic of Lebanon in 1926, and in 1943 the country 
achieved its independence.45 
The Republic of Lebanon was from the outset a contested entity, with conflicting views on the 
very nature of this state. Some held the view that the whole idea of a separate Lebanese state 
was a mistake, that it was wrong to divide it from Syria. Others favoured independence, but 
disagreed about its nature – Arab or Lebanese. Many Maronites favoured an emphasis on 
Lebanese particularities, i.e. a Christian majority country with old and strong links with the 
West, separating it from the rest of the Middle East. Others, not least the Sunni community, 
favoured an emphasis on the Arab character of the new state.46 
The new Republic of Lebanon faced numerous challenges, not least concerning government 
and the distribution of power within it. The founders of the Republic adopted the so-called 
National Pact, al-mithaq al-waṭanī, as the power-sharing formula. One should bear in mind 
that these founding fathers (needless to say they were all men) did not represent a broad strata 
of Lebanese society. They were all members of the elite: landowners, bankers, merchants and 
so on.47 
This unwritten pact stipulated that the President of the Republic, along with the commander 
of the Army and the director of Public Security should be Maronites; the premiership became 
the preserve of the Sunnis, while the speaker of Parliament was allotted to the Shiites. The 
remainder of the seats in Parliament and the administrative positions was distributed among 
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the 17 different religious sects that were officially recognized at the time, but at a ratio of 6:5 
in Christian favour.48 Giving a majority of positions to Christians has often been viewed as 
unfair and undemocratic, but when the National Pact was drawn up it seems that the main 
concern was to allay Christian fears of ending up as a minority among Muslims, as was the 
case with other Christians in the Middle East. 
However, this power-sharing formula did not solve the fundamental questions concerning the 
identity of the state, for a number of reasons. Some of these were related to those who were 
chosen to represent the different sects, which was clearly the case for the Shiite communities 
and their representatives. According to the National Pact, the Shiites were considered to be 
the third largest of the sects and were allocated positions accordingly, with the foremost 
representative of the sect in the state institutions being the speaker of parliament. However, 
those representing the Shiites when the Pact was drawn up belonged more often than not to 
the old class of feudal landowners, known as zuʿamāʾ, who put their own interests at the 
forefront, at the cost of the interests of the Shiites at large.49 
The developments in the region in the following decades further exacerbated these tensions 
within the state itself, reaching a peak in 1958 when the country for the first time was at the 
brink of a civil war, only prevented by an American military intervention. However, the 
problems were not solved, rather put under a lid, soon to emerge again, this time the 
difference being over which direction the Republic should take. By this time Nasser [Jamāl 
ʿAbd al-Naṣīr] had firmly established his pan-Arab-oriented republic in Egypt, entered into a 
union with Syria and promoted himself as the undisputed leader of the Arab world. His 
message of Arab unity in the face of Western imperialism and Israel was welcomed by many 
in Lebanon as well, not least among the Sunnis. An additional question, that proved to 
become the main point of divergence, emerged after the Arab defeat in the war of 1967 – and 
it became acute following the events in Jordan three years later – it was what position should 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization have in Lebanon? 
In 1969 the Lebanese government, under heavy pressure from other Arab regimes, signed an 
agreement brokered by Nasser. It allowed the Palestinians to conduct military operations 
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against Israel from Lebanese soil, and in addition it gave the Palestinians full control of the 
Palestinian refugee camps shattered across the country.50  
These were challenges to the authority of the state, including the fundamental principle of it 
being the sole provider of armed forces such as the police and the army. 
 
4.2 The civil war and its impact 
The outcome of challenging the state’s authority in this way culminated in 1975 with the 
outbreak of a civil war that lasted for fifteen years, and the almost complete collapse of the 
Lebanese state.  
During the war, one of the most significant developments was that the Syrians established 
themselves as the main power-broker in the country. They entered Lebanon in 1976 as a 
peacekeeping force invited by the then President Sarkis [Sarkīs] and sanctioned by the Arab 
League,51 and in the course of the next fifteen years they managed to expand their presence in 
the military and political arenas to the extent that any agreement between the Lebanese or 
between Lebanon and other countries became impossible without obtaining an approval from 
the Syrians.52 The war ended with a Saudi-sponsored and Syrian-supported agreement known 
as the Taif Agreement, named after the Saudi town where the politicians and warlords met 
and decided the future of the country. Most noteworthy in the agreement was the change in 
the power-balance between the Christians and the Muslims, which was altered from a 5:6 
ratio in favour of the Christians to a 5:5 ratio, and in the equation of power between the 
President, the Speaker of Parliament and the Prime Minister.53   
However, the end of the war did not produce a strong and independent state, and many of the 
fundamental differences remained unsolved. The result was a state where another state, Syria, 
had the final say in all affairs of any importance and the headquarters of the Syrian 
Intelligence in Anjar became more important than the Lebanese parliament, and it was 
frequented by most of the elected politicians.  
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Another point not to be missed about the post-war Lebanese system is that the armed wing of 
Hizballah, the Islamic Resistance (al-Muqāwama al-ʾIslāmiyya), was allowed to keep its 
weapons, as it was now defined as a national resistance army that fought the Israeli 
occupation in the south on behalf of the Lebanese state. Other parties and the militias had 
been disarmed as a part of the Taif-agreement, but Hizballah insisted it was not a militia and 
with Iranian backing and Syrian consent obtained this unique position. 
 
4.3 Sectarianism 
Lebanon thus has a political system where representation is based on sectarian religious 
affiliation. The concept of sectarianism is a complex one, and indeed a contested one as well, 
and a concept many have blamed for being at the core of Lebanon’s problems.54 Therefore, a 
closer look at this concept is inevitable if one wishes to understand Lebanese politics and 
society. For this it is necessary to look at its origins, in the Ottoman Empire. 
The Ottoman Empire came to be perceived by Sunni Muslims from inside and outside of it as 
the leading Sunni Muslim authority in the world, the Caliphate, with the reigning Emperor as 
the Caliph, the embodiment of Sunni orthodoxy. Other religions in the Empire were organized 
through what was known as the Millet system. This meant that groups were organized on the 
basis of which Millet, that is, confessional community, they belonged to, not grouped by 
ethnicity or language. Each confessional community had its own courts so it could rule itself 
under its own ‘personal law’. Each Millet was usually led by the head of each confessional 
community, so for example the Greek Orthodox Millet was headed by the Patriarch, who in 
turn had a very close relationship with the Emperor. In this respect, it is of utmost importance 
to note that other Muslim confessions, like Shiites, Druze, Alawis and so on, were not treated 
as separate Millets, but were subject to Sunni jurisprudence. 
At the outset of the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire began to show serious signs of 
weakness, for a number of reasons. Foreign powers began to make their presence felt and the 
Empire began to disintegrate. Egypt had been briefly occupied by France, and was ‘liberated’ 
by a joint Ottoman-British force, but quickly became a sovereign province. Greece became 
independent in the 1820s, and was recognized as such by the Emperor in 1829. 
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In trying to curb these developments and also in order to modernize the ineffective 
administration of the Empire, what became known as the Tanzimat was launched in 1839. 
These were a series of unprecedented reforms, but for this purpose one reform stands out, the 
dismantling of the Millet system. From then on, every subject of the Ottoman Empire was to 
be treated as an equal, or so it was understood by some.55  
Mount Lebanon, the core of what later became the Republic of Lebanon, was a multi-
religious region, with Maronites and Druze forming the two main components, at times ruled 
by the Sunni Shihābī family, at others by a Druze Qāʾim Maqām. Following the 
announcement of the Tanzimat, some Maronite laymen took them to mean that all men were 
now equals under the Sublime Porte, something which clearly was not the intent of the 
Ottomans. Theirs was a project of modernization on several levels, but it seems that at no 
point did they intend to change the social order of Mount Lebanon.56 The Maronite revolt that 
eventually broke out was also a revolt against fellow Maronites who rejected to give 
‘commoners’ a say in the affairs of the community. It ended with thousands of Maronites 
being massacred by their Druze neighbours in 1860, and crucially with an increased foreign 
presence in Mount Lebanon. 
This presence had made itself felt even before the events of 1860, but now this development 
accelerated. Not only France but also Britain was active, each portraying themselves as being 
the protector of one of the ‘nations’ inhabiting the mountains. This is of crucial importance, as 
this way of defining people on the basis of their religious belonging, as different ‘tribes’, was 
new.57 France used the massacres of 1860 to strengthen its presence in Lebanon as protectors 
of the Christians and actively pressured the Empire to grant Mount Lebanon an increased 
level of autonomy. 
 
4.4 The parliamentary system 
The legacy of these events was felt from then to the inception of the  Republic of Lebanon 
and continues on today in the form of a parliamentary system based on sectarian 
representation.  
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Steps were taken from the very beginning of the Republic of Lebanon to counter negative 
aspects of this system and to promote intra-communal political integration. The country was 
divided into administrative units and electoral constituencies which were multi-confessional, 
thus promoting political cooperation and interaction. The constituencies were, and continue to 
be, multi-member, so the electorate votes not only for candidates of the same sect as they 
themselves belong to, but for candidates of other sects as well. If we take the example of the 
qaḍāʾ administrative and electoral district of Marjayoun/Hasbaya to which Khiam belongs, 
we find that this district is allotted five MPs: two Shiites, one Druze, one Greek Orthodox and 
one Sunni.58 A voter in this district, irrespective of his or her own sectarian belonging, is 
voting for a list of five candidates, with the abovementioned sectarian balance. For instance, a 
Maronite will not be allowed to run in the elections in this district, although he will of course 
have the right to vote. The voter can usually choose among several candidates, but this 
district, along with most other districts in south Lebanon, will find that the main actors here, 
i.e. Hizballah in cooperation with Amal and other allies, have settled the elections before they 
take place. The list endorsed by them will be the one to win, even though in some cases there 
will be opposing candidates. 
One of the main reasons for this is another particular feature of the Lebanese system. Voters 
are registered in the village or town from where their family originates, and are only allowed 
to vote there. With the displacement following the civil war and demographic changes, i.e. as 
more non-Shiites moved from the area, this means that a district such as Marjayoun/Hasbaya 
has a clear majority of Shiite voters. In some instances this does not seem to be the case when 
one looks at the registered voters in a given district, but the actual voter turnout shows that 
this pattern is valid. If we take the example of Baabda, to which the southern suburbs of 
Beirut belong, this is evident. Here there were registered 48,180 Maronite voters, of whom 
27,359 turned out, giving a percentage of 56.78%. In the same district the number of 
registered Shiite votes is 34,524, of whom 21,239 turned out to vote, giving a percentage of 
61.52%. This district – on paper – has a clear majority of Maronite voters, just under 14,000 
more Maronite voters than Shiite, while the actual turnout shows that the difference here is 
only just under 6,000 voters in favour of the Maronites.59 
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Needless to say, the electoral system is also constantly debated, not least the size of the 
electoral constituencies, but for the last two elections, in 2005 and 2009 respectively, the 
same system based on the qaḍāʾ model has been observed. 
 
4.5 The Lebanese Shiites 
A brief glance at the Shiites of Lebanon and their history is necessary. This is not one single 
community, as one could be led to believe, but rather it consists of several communities each 
with its own characteristics and history. That the Shiites of Lebanon today are treated as one 
single community, not least thanks to the efforts of Hizballah in promoting this unified 
picture, does not change this. The most prominent of these areas is Jabal Amil situated in the 
south of the country, bordering Palestine and Syria. This used to be a well-known centre of 
Shiite learning, long before the rise of Najaf, Qom and other centres, and this fact is even 
today a source of great pride for Lebanese Shiites.60 Learning was not centred around great 
mosques, as is the case with other centres of learning, rather it took place in the modest 
houses of the ʿulamāʾ who lived and taught there. When the Shiite school became the official 
religion in Persia with the founding of the Safavid Empire in 1700, they brought a significant 
number of scholars from Jabal Amil to serve the Empire. 
The area was and still is mainly an agrarian one, with tobacco being the most common crop. 
Today the area has developed in much the same way as other areas in Lebanon, with a large 
percentage of the population working and living in other places, both on the outskirts of Sidon 
and Beirut, but also outside Lebanon. The Gulf states have for a long time been the preferred 
destination. My sources in Khiam all agreed that Kuwait was the most important place for 
Khiam’s diaspora, only the raʾīs al-baladiyya claimed that the Emirates had take the position 
Kuwait used to occupy. 
The other main concentration of Shiites is found in the Bekaa, especially in the areas of 
Baalbek – Hirmil, but unlike the situation in the south, these societies are clan-based. While in 
the south one could talk about noble families, in these districts clan solidarity takes 
superiority. Traditionally mainly pastoral, there is also some agriculture here, especially south 
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of Baalbek, but today the Hirmil is probably better known for its production of hashish than 
anything else. 
Due to its proximity to Syria, this area was of vital importance for the establishing of 
Hizballah, as will be dealt with later in this thesis. 
The third main concentration of Shiites in Lebanon is in al-Ḍāḥiya, the southern suburbs of 
Beirut. It is here the leadership of Hizballah lives and work. Fadlallah with his institutions is 
based here, along with other Shiite institutions such as the Higher Council. As mentioned 
above, these parts of Beirut actually belong to the district of Baʿabda and are separate 
municipalities. What is now referred to as al-Ḍāḥiya is actually a collection of small villages 
that used to be outside Beirut but has merged together with the city in the course of the last 
half century or so. This is also where the Palestinian refugee camps in the capital are situated, 
the Burj al-Barājna camp being the largest. Most of these villages had a Christian majority 
before the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 but at the very beginning of it, this started to 
change. Some of the areas had a Shiite majority even before the war, such as Shiyya, while 
others like Burj al-Barajneh had a considerable Shiite minority. When the war broke out, 
Christians started to flee the area as Palestinian guerrillas and their Lebanese allies took 
control, while Shiites went the opposite direction, from al-Nabaʿa and other places in the 
eastern part of Beirut towards al-Ḍāḥiya. Today the area is almost exclusively Shiite, save for 
the Palestinian camps. 
 
4.6 The religious hierarchy and the position of the 
clerics. 
Some words about the religious organization of the Shiites, in Lebanon and other places, are 
necessary in order for us to understand the importance and position of clerics among the 
Shiites. Without dwelling on the development of Shiism as such, one aspect is of great 
importance: that is, who holds the right to rule.  
The twelve Imams who according to the Shiites followed Muhammad as leaders of the 
ʾumma, the Muslim nation, held extraordinary powers. They inherited the prerogatives of 
Muhammad, and although they are not considered to be prophets, they are considered as 
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being free from sin and error.61 As long as there was an Imam present, the question of who 
should lead the ʾumma was not debated. The twelfth and last of these Imams, Muḥammad al-
Muntaẓar or al-Mahdī, represents a key to our understanding of Shiism. According to the 
Shiite doctrine, he went into occultation, ghayba, and will only reappear on the day of 
judgement. This left a void still debated to this day, as the question arose: who can now lead 
the nation? A majority held the view that in the absence of the Imam, no government or ruler 
could be considered legitimate. That is not to say that they would resist the rulers of their 
societies, but at the same time they would not bestow upon them legitimacy, as this would be 
to equate them with the awaited Imam. 
The opposite of this position started to develop some time after the last Imam went into 
occultation, although it was only after the Safavid dynasty was established in Persia that its 
development gathered pace. This view gave the ʿulamāʾ a central position, as they were now 
considered to be the general representative (al-nāʾib al-ʿāmm) of the hidden Imam. It became 
obligatory for the believers to pay religious taxes to the ʿulamāʾ,62 a fact that over time gave 
them a strong and somehow independent position vis-a-vis the state. This trend developed 
further until it reached a point where such Shiite scholars as Muhammad al Shirāzī advocated 
that the state should be ruled by the ‘just jurist’ (al-faqīh al-ʿādil).63 The most well-known of 
these scholars is Khomeini, who together with Montazeri formulated the theory of the rule of 
the jurist (wilāyat al-faqīh), the general representative of the hidden Imam on earth. Although 
this trend of clerical involvement in politics had started many decades before, this theory 
placed them on top of the political hierarchy. Without their involvement no rule could be 
considered just. 
In Lebanon, the impact of the clerics on the Shiites is also clearly visible, from Musa al-Sadr 
[Mūsā al-Ṣadr], who was the one who instigated the involvement of the Shiites, as Shiites, in 
politics, to Fadlallah, who in the nineties reached the highest position in the Shiite religious 
hierarchy, that of marjiʿ al-taqlīd, often translated as ‘source of emulation’.  
Shiites, and indeed also many Sunnis, give a prominent role to clerics, as they have the 
knowledge to understand and explain the sources of religious legislation, the Quran, the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, his sayings and for the Shiites also the writings and 
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statements of the twelve Imams. However, unlike the Sunnis, the Shiites have a clearer 
defined religious hierarchy, on the bottom of which is the mujtahid. This is a person who, 
after studying at one of the religious seminaries, obtains an ʾijāza from a senior cleric under 
whom he has studied. This makes him able to issue fatāwā, religious rulings, based on the 
sources mentioned above and commonly in accordance with the rulings of the teacher who 
gave him the ʾijāza.64 In recent times, and especially after the revolution in Iran which 
brought Khomeini to power, the term ʾāyat Allāh, sign of God, is used for an established 
mujtahid, with the added ʿuẓmā, ‘Grand’, indicating that this is one of the few senior clerics 
who is also a ‘source of emulation’, which has become a separate institution. 
All believing Shiites are supposed to choose their ‘source of emulation’, on a free, individual 
basis, and to follow his rulings and directions in all questions related to belief. This includes 
everything from the position taken when performing the prayers, the start and end of 
Ramadan, questions of inheritance and political leadership and positions (given that the marjiʿ 
in question advocates these). Therefore a believer who has chosen to follow a particular 
marjiʿ al-taqlīd is also referred to as a muqallid, emulator, of this or that marjiʿ. 
 
4.7 Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah 
Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah was born in Iraq in 1935, some eight years after his parents 
emigrated to Najaf from the south of Lebanon in order for his father to pursue religious 
studies there. He received his first religious training from his father, together with two of his 
brothers, and later continued his studies with others from the respected and renowned ʿulamāʾ 
residing there. 
Najaf was at that point the undisputed centre of Shiite learning, and all the leading marājiʿa 
were based there. It is also worth bearing in mind that this was the time when many of the 
younger generation of ʿulamāʾ started to engage in politics, and the Fadlallah was one of 
these. One of the most famous of these ʿulamāʾ was Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, who is 
perhaps most known as one of the funders of the Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-ʾIslāmiyya. This party is 
significant in several respects: it was the first ever Shiite political party, and although it was 
formed by laymen, it gave the ʿulamāʾ a leading political role. This went against the line 
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followed by the marājiʿ of the time, like that of Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm and ʿAbd al-Qāsim al-
Khūʿī, who advocated that the ʾulamāʾ should stay out of politics.  
These were the formative years in the long career of Fadlallah, and are important in order to 
understand his later political stances. Fadlallah settled permanently in Lebanon in the mid-
sixties upon an invitation from a group of believers centred in the Nabaa area of Beirut. They 
dispatched an envoy to the marjiʿ al-Khūʿī to ask for an ʿālim to come to Lebanon and guide 
them, and al-Khūʿī ‘honoured us by sending the Sayyid’.65 Despite of different views on 
politics and the participation of ʿulamāʾ in it, this did not hinder al-Khūʿī from appointing 
Fadlallah as his personal representative in Lebanon, which he remained until the death of al- 
Kho'i in 1990.  
One of the first achievements of Fadlallah was to set up an institute for religious studies, and 
thus starting what is now referred to as his ḥawza, religious seminary. Initially it seems he 
devoted his time more to studies and social work than engaging in politics. This is probably 
due to the fact that fellow cleric Musa al-Sadr at this time became one of the leading Shiite 
social and political leaders of these communities. However, following the latter’s 
disappearance in 1978 and the subsequent revolution in Iran, Fadlallah emerged as one of the 
staunchest supporters of the revolution, and an important Shiite leader. While he denies, as do 
his followers, that he had any role in the establishment of Hizballah, there is no doubt that he 
was very close to them, and was regularly consulted and asked for advice.   
Following the death of al Khūʿī,  Fadlallah chose to follow ʿAli Sistānī (who is still the most 
influential marjiʿ in the world) until he himself became a marjiʿ in 199566. 
His views, and the relationship between him and Hizballah, will be dealt with in subsequent 
chapters, but as will be evident, much of the material in this thesis is obtained from him and 
his followers, not least from my fieldwork. Fadlallah died in June 2010, following a period of 
illness.  
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5 A Shiite town in south Lebanon 
5.1 A local community and the question of 
hegemony 
How can I defend the argument that Hizballah is seeking to exert a hegemony over Shiite 
Lebanon?  In 2.6 I wrote that the concept of hegemony I use consists of several fields, the 
economic, the state and civil society. As will be evident from what I wrote earlier, there are 
certain conditions which have to be in place in order for us to talk about a hegemony. Does 
the population accept the role of the Islamic Resistance as the defender of their land and the 
providers of security for them in their daily lives? As for the civil society, an important factor 
to clarify is what kind of organizations operate on the ground and their role in this society at 
large. Another question of great importance is that of representation, whom does the 
population see as representing them politically? How are other political forces viewed and 
treated? The very same questions can be asked about religion, to whom does the population 
refer in religious questions and how are other religious authorities viewed? And who has the 
economic means to provide services to the population? 
5.2 Khiam 
The town of Khiam is situated in the middle of Jabal Amil, on a hilltop just south of 
Marjayoun, which is the regional centre and the biggest town in the area, and capital of the 
Marjayoun qaḍāʾ to which Khiam belongs. This qaḍāʾ is again part of the muḥāfaẓa of 
Nabatieh. The number of inhabitants is difficult to asses, the main reason being the large 
number who do not live in Khiam permanently. My sources and others I spoke to claimed the 
number of permanent residents to be around seven thousand, swelling to around fifteen in the 
weekends and holidays. However, the number of voters registered here is much larger and the 
official number of residents is around thirty thousand.67 
When asked where the remainder of the population lived, various people immediately 
mentioned Kuwait. One even claimed that several thousand from Khiam lived there. The raʾīs 
al-baladiyya told me that while Kuwait had been the preferred destination of emigration for 
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years, he now believed the Emirates to be the main destination. In addition to emigration, a 
large number live and work in other parts of Lebanon, mainly in Beirut, but many also in 
Nabatieh, Tyre and Sidon, which are in the southern parts of the country. 
There had been emigration earlier, but it became significant when by the beginning of the 
seventies, large numbers had emigrated from the south (including Khiam), to Beirut and 
abroad. There were several factors causing this, not least difficulties in the agricultural sector, 
which played a very prominent role.68 This coincided with the increased activities of 
Palestinian guerrilla organizations, who following the so-called Cairo agreement of 1969 were 
allowed to operate from Lebanon. When Israel retaliated, it was more often than not the 
civilian population of the south who had to face the consequences. The feeling of 
disenfranchisement was increased by the fact that the PLO became a state-within-the-state in 
these areas, particularly so after the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. Large sections of the 
population came to feel a strong resentment against Palestinians, even among religious Shiites 
who supported their cause. As an older man, a muqallid of Fadlallah who I spoke to in a 
neighbouring village said, ‘You just don’t behave like that when you are a guest of someone, 
mā biṣīr, what would you have done if you had invited some guests just to find that they had 
taken over your house and treated you as a stranger?’. It should be noted that this is just one 
part of the picture: many young Shiites joined Palestinian groups and fought for them as 
well.69  
While the civil war ended in 1990, Israel continued to occupy southern Lebanon through its 
proxy, the South Lebanese Army. Those who remained in Khiam and the south during these 
years had few options when it came to making a living. Many worked in Israel or enrolled in 
the SLA to make a living, while others took advantage of the presence of UNIFIL forces and 
worked with them, either by being employed directly or by setting up cafes, bars or other 
outlets aimed at the foreign soldiers.70 
 
5.3 UNIFIL 
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UNIFIL was set up following the Israeli invasion in 1978 by United Nations Security Council 
resolutions 425 and 426. As the name implies (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), it 
was meant to be a temporary force, with a mandate to monitor the Israeli withdrawal and help 
the Lebanese government to restore its authority over the area. As the Israelis did not 
withdraw, UNIFIL continued its presence, putting an emphasis on providing humanitarian aid 
to the inhabitants left there, and to try to protect them from Israeli raids. From 1982 on, an 
important task was also to monitor the developments between the Israelis and the increasingly 
active Islamic Resistance. Following the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from most of the 
occupied south Lebanon in 2000, a new situation emerged. The Lebanese state did not 
consider the withdrawal to be complete, so it refused to let the Lebanese Army resume its 
responsibilities in the south. It could not be seen to ‘police’ the south and thereby become 
involved directly in the armed conflict that continued between Hizballah and the Israelis. This 
new situation meant that Hizballah and its Islamic Resistance was now the sole armed 
presence in this part of the country, and in the years from 2000 to 2006 the party exploited its 
new position to strengthen its military power and influence, which became evident in the July 
2006 war.  
Relations between UNIFIL and locals have been generally good, but from the beginning of 
2010, reaching a peak in June, there have been several clashes between UNIFIL forces and 
locals. While Hizballah has not commented on these events, a UNIFIL official linked this to 
the implementation of UN resolution 1701,71 which brought an end to the war in July 2006.72  
 
5.4 The July 2006 war 
On 12 July 2006, soldiers from the Islamic Resistance crossed the Blue Line and abducted 
two Israeli soldiers and killed three others.73 The purpose was to use these abducted soldiers 
as bargaining chips in a prisoner-exchange with the Israelis, something the party had 
successfully done before. However, this time the operation led Israel to launch a full-scale 
war on Lebanon, damaging much of its infrastructure, not least in the south. During the war 
between Hizballah and Israel, Khiam was among the towns in the south that saw immense 
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destruction, being situated close to the border itself, with the Islamic Resistance using it as a 
launching area for its rockets. My contacts and the raʾīs al-baladiyya told me that as many as 
70% of all houses in the town were completely destroyed, and that the majority of its citizens 
fled northwards for safety.74 
Based on what my sources and contacts told to me, the war came as both a surprise and a 
shock to most of them. Just six years after many of them came back to the town and re-
established themselves there, the experience of having to flee for their lives once again led 
many to consider solutions to the conflict with Israel other than those officially promoted by 
the Islamic Resistance.  
The hostilities ended with the adoption of UN resolution 1701, forcing Hizballah to move its 
armed presence to the north of the Litani River, and it paved the way for the Lebanese Army 
to enter the south for the first time since 1978, in cooperation and coordination with a 
strengthened and expanded UNIFIL force. 
Most significant for my study is the exposure of the power structures in the south and indeed 
in the rest of Lebanon, that followed in the wake of the war, and the crisis this resulted in. It 
became clear that it was not the Lebanese state that was in charge of such an important 
decision as whether to launch a war or not. In fact, the country witnessed a war launched by 
their neighbouring state on a non-state actor in their country. The formidable military strength 
of Hizballah was also exposed, frightening many of their adversaries, who feared that this 
would eventually be used against them, despite assurances from Hizballah that their weapons 
were only to be used against the Israelis. As we shall see, it also had a profound effect on the 
party’s own power base in the south, which consisted of the people who suffered the most 
from the results of the war. 
 
5.5 ‘We don’t have a state, we have parties’ 
The overwhelming response I got to my question of how people perceived the presence of the 
state in Khiam was ‘We don’t have a state here!’ or ‘There is no state here’. These responses 
were unanimous, and came directly and without any hesitation on part of the responders. In 
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most cases, an illuminating phrase would also be added: ‘We have parties [here]’ (‘ʿandnā 
ʾaḥzāb’). This was in most instances presented as a regrettable fact, as the expression ‘lil-
ʾasaf’ or ‘maʿ al-ʾasaf’ would be added. Some of the responses would express it with more 
resignation than others, and some would be expressed with more defiance. Not surprisingly, 
those who did not add the phrase ‘We have parties’, declared sympathy towards a party, and 
in all but a couple of instances this was towards Hizballah and the resistance. 
However, it is interesting to note the near identical responses from the different people I 
interviewed, both the fact that the state was perceived to be largely absent, and the fact that 
most people I spoke with perceived the parties to act as a state, or in some form having taken 
the place of the state. 
In the course of my conversations, a more nuanced picture of the situation emerged, and even 
though the grievances were the same, it became clear that the state in fact was present on 
some levels. A man I spoke to turned out to be a state employee (muwẓẓaf al-dawla) even 
though he had initially expressed that he considered the state to be by and large absent from 
Khiam and the rest of the south. I also met the principal at the local government school in 
Khiam, and although he had a similar perception to the majority, he admitted that the state at 
least tried to fulfil some of its obligations, for instance in education. 
Others would also point out that some relief and funds came from the state, but in these cases 
this would be linked to one politician, Nabih Berri [Nabīh Birrī], due to his position in the 
government-run ‘Council of the South’ (majlis al-janūb).  
A phrase that is interesting in the context of this thesis is ‘ʿandnā ʾaḥzāb’, as this implies that 
there is not a situation were one party is solely in control, or that one party alone has taken 
over the functions of the state. In this respect, another observation is of great importance, 
namely which parties are present, and where they are present. In Khiam, and surrounding 
villages with a Shiite majority, I found no open presence in the form of banners, posters or 
other signs of parties linked to the March 14 grouping. ‘These people have no support here, 
that's why they are not present, no-one supports them’ – this is how one of my contacts 
explained the situation, and he went on to say unequivocally, ‘Hariri doesn’t have any support 
in the south, even his hometown is ruled by the opposition!’ 
Besides the massive presence of Hizballah, through posters, flags, relief organizations and 
their collection boxes placed in stores and supermarkets, the other most visible party was 
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Amal. Their traditional stronghold is in the south and although their presence did not seem to 
be as massive as that of Hizballah, they seemed to have a substantial following as well. 
Pictures and flags of their Christian allies in the Free Patriotic Movement and the Marada 
could also be found, along with some scattered flags from the Communist Party. Remarkably, 
I observed little presence of the Syrian Social National Party, whose current leader is from 
Marjayoun and was elected an MP on the coalition list of March 8. 
In mixed villages or places without a Shiite majority, the picture seemed to be different. 
When driving from Marjayoun to Ibl on my first day there, I immediately noticed an 
enormous portrait of late Premier Hariri covering the whole side of a house along the way. 
Although there was a visible presence of other parties, the general impression was that the 
presence was more low-key in these areas, for all parties. 
Based on the above observations, it seems fair to say that the vast majority of the population 
in Khiam view the Lebanese state as being largely absent from their lives and that it is unable 
or unwilling to provide them with the security they need, be it social or military. It is also fair 
to say, based on my observations, that for a majority this is a regrettable fact. Most of those I 
spoke with would tell me directly that they wanted the state to take up its responsibilities. In 
other words, the absence of the state is viewed as a problem. 
 
5.6 The neglected periphery 
When I asked the people I talked to about the reasons for what they perceived to be the 
absence of the state, almost unanimously the explanation they offered me was a variation on 
‘It is always like this, all over the world! The south is always neglected, look at South 
America or the southern parts of Africa and Europe, it's the same. The south is always 
neglected, I’m sure it’s like this in south Norway as well!’ – so said one man I had a long 
conversation with outside his workshop. Different varieties of this answer were offered by 
everyone I asked, not necessarily with a focus on the south, but on the fact that they were on 
the periphery of the country. Many would also point out that the south is not the only part of 
Lebanon that is less developed, and mentioned Akkar as another example. Some would also 
mention the Bekaa in this respect. 
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This answer is interesting on many levels, first because it does not link the absence of the 
state in their areas to any political trend. In fact, people were eager to make clear that this was 
not a new situation. Although the criticism of the current government in general, and Hariri in 
particular, was harsh, they would also criticize former governments for neglect.  
It is of interest on another level as well, as it does not link the perceived absence to the fact 
that they are Shiites, and the traditional image that the Shiites and the parts of the country 
with a Shiite majority are the most underdeveloped and neglected. The area they compared 
themselves to, Akkar, has a clear majority of Sunnis and is located in the extreme north of the 
country. 
Although seeming rather fatalistic, the answer that it has always been like this should not, 
however, be taken as an acceptance of the status quo. All the responses came with a clear 
opinion that it should not continue like this forever, and that now was the time to bridge the 
differences between the towns, or rather between Beirut and the underdeveloped parts of the 
country. 
 
5.7 The view from raʾīs al-baladiyya 
The raʾīs al-baladiyya, ʿAlī Zarīq, is the representative for a large section of the inhabitants of 
the town. He lives and works in Beirut and only comes to Khiam in the weekends. This means 
that when he is present, there are long lines of people wanting to see him for all kinds of 
reasons. It could be a permission of some kind, dispute over land, or building projects and so 
on. 
When I came to the baladiyya on an early Saturday morning, the place was already bustling 
with life, and his secretary asked me to wait for some minutes. She was a young woman, not 
veiled, and dressed like any other Lebanese of her age. With her tight-fitting jeans she was 
quite a contrast to the local village police, with their beards and loose-fitting green uniforms. 
‘Don’t be afraid, it’s just the village police,’ my companion said as we waited for our turn. 
In common with my other sources, the raʾīs al-baladiyya was very frustrated about the 
current state of affairs and the absence of the state. As leader of the baladiyya he saw his role 
as representing Khiam vis-à-vis the state and to secure services and welfare for the citizens. 
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He claimed that there were no politics on part of the state to care for other parts of the country 
outside Beirut, and his response is thus very much in line with most others who also pointed 
at the geographical reason for the absence. He said that people were mainly employed in 
agriculture and small-scale industry, but pointing at the lack of work opportunities he voiced 
his concern that the state had done nothing to create jobs and thereby contribute to a stable 
situation in the south: ‘Without the remittances sent from fellow villagers in the Gulf, the 
situation would have been very hard here.’ He also mentioning increased economic activity 
during summer as a result of all the people returning from abroad to spend their money 
locally. Here he saw another problem: there is no bank in Khiam and people would have to go 
to Majayoun if they needed this kind of services. 
Of the many things lacking in the town, the most pressing, as he saw it, was a hospital. He 
considered the hospital in Marjayoun to be of poor quality and said that any serious illness or 
injury would require the patient to go to Nabatieh or Sidon for treatment. It sounded as if they 
were trying to convince the authorities to build a hospital there, but ran into what he described 
as a major problem, that is the system itself. ‘This system is not sound, sālim, it’s all 
sectarian, ṭāʾifī, and not working for the interests of the people. When we want something 
from the authorities we find ourselves in a situation where we have to do like the other 
parties, even if we don't like it. Someone knows someone who can get things fixed, and we 
have to play along with this in order to get anything done. Unfortunately, lil-ʾassaf.’ 
Also in common with everyone else I met he was quick to praise Qatar for their contribution 
to the reconstruction of Khiam following the July War of 2006, claiming that 90% of the 
funding was from the Gulf state alone. Iran had take upon itself to repair all the roads 
damaged in the war, also a considerable task given the level of destruction.  
 
5.8 Who is viewed to be the ‘sulṭa’? 
5.8.1 Politically 
In the absence of the state, who is then perceived to be the authority? Clearly, on a local level 
there is the majlis al-baladiyya, or just al-baladiyya, the town council. This organ is elected 
locally, and is supposed to deal with local politics and to represent the town vis-à-vis the state 
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and its institutions. In Khiam, the inhabitants all seemed to have some kind of relations with 
this local organ, but herein lies a problem as well: as the problems stemming from state 
absence is far bigger than those that the baladiyya can deal with, no-one expects them to be 
able to solve any of these, whether related to education, health or other areas.  
Concerning the political representation of Khiam on a national level, there was a common 
agreement among those I spoke to that given the size of the town it should have an MP. For 
several periods they have been represented by Ali Hassan Khalil [ʿAlī Ḥasan Khalīl], who is 
from Khiam and member of Amal, and is considered the right-hand man of Amal leader 
Nabih Berri. Khalil is also seen as being close to Hizballah, and on many occasions he has 
been the one representing Berri, like on the marking of Martyrs Day (yawm al-shuhadāʾ), 
when the party holds large gatherings with speeches by the Secretary-General or his Deputy.75 
Some of my contacts voiced their reservations about Khalil, claiming that he is too much like 
all other politicians. At one point in a conversation, a man complained about the upcoming 
election campaign and said that rumours were that Khalil had already started to hand out 
money to secure his re-election. Accusations like these are of course impossible to verify, but 
I find it worth mentioning, as it shows that even among people who consider themselves as 
being close to the political trend Khalil represents, and who vote for him, there is a conviction 
that politicians like him engage in the same manoeuvring that the opposing camp is accused 
of employing.  
 
5.8.2 Security and ‘al-waḍʿ al-ʾamnī’ 
The so-called security situation, al-waḍʿ  al-ʾamnī, is an ever-present concept covering many 
aspects of the general situation in Khiam and the south. I discovered quickly what the 
implications of this concept were: the party, through its resistance, was in complete control 
militarily over Khiam. On one of my first days in the town, I was told that due to al-waḍʿ al-
ʾamnī, they had informed al-maʾsūl al-ʾamnī, the security responsible, about my presence 
there. This man, Ḥajj S., was from the party, and again, due to al-waḍʿ al-ʾamnī, severe 
limitations were put on my ability to work freely in the town. I could not leave the offices of 
Mabbarat without being accompanied by one of the staff, nor could I spend nights there. They 
were, however, happy to have me there as long as I complied with these rules, and should 
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anyone stop me or mention anything about my presence, I was told to just tell them that I had 
the permission of Ḥajj S.   
This situation seemed to be dealt with as a matter of fact, and no-one I met questioned the fact 
that Hizballah were the ones responsible for dealing with the security of the inhabitants. It is 
of course impossible to appraise this situation without taking into consideration the events 
witnessed by the town in the recent years, not least the July 2006 war between the Israelis and 
Hizballah and its repercussions.  
One significant aspect is the threat of renewed hostilities. Even though there were no signs 
that a new conflict was imminent, the party themselves and many of the people I spoke to saw 
themselves locked in an eternal struggle which would last as long as there existed an Israeli 
state, and so they were in a state of more or less constant alert. Israel continues to violate 
Lebanese airspace with both drones and warplanes breaking the sound barrier over the town, 
adding to the feeling of being under threat.   
Another factor complicating the matter was the increasing number of Israeli spies and spy 
networks that were uncovered, both at the time I was there and later on. As far as I am aware, 
few if any of those apprehended and accused of spying have yet been convicted of doing so, 
but it would not be surprising if many of them were actually guilty, given the fact that several 
others have managed to flee to Israel, and given the state of war the two sides find themselves 
in. Several of the detainees are from Khiam and surrounding towns and villages. 
UNIFIL forces do not have a base in Khiam itself, as they do in neighbouring towns and 
villages, and although no-one had many negative things to say about them, UNIFIL seemed 
rather irrelevant when talking about al-waḍʿ al-ʾamnī. This means that they were not expected 
to be able to offer any kind of protection to the population should a new war break out. Much 
the same can be said of the Lebanese army.  
5.8.3 Religious authority and Khiam as a Shiite town 
When I first approached Mabarat and told them about my intention to do fieldwork in a Shiite 
village, they suggested that I should go to Bint Jbayl or Khiam. I subsequently choose Khiam 
because it is the smaller of the two, and I imagined it would be easier for me to get a more 
thorough impression of the state of affairs in a smaller town. However, I made it clear that I 
wanted to go to a Shiite village. Therefore it came as a surprise to me that the first thing I saw 
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when entering the town was a church, so I asked the men from Mabarrat who were driving me 
about it. They replied that, yes, of course there were Christians in Khiam as well, but most of 
them had left the town. Some would come for the weekend, while others would just visit in 
the summer. Others again had left the town permanently. 
I was reluctant to query further, well aware that this is a sensitive issue. Officially, and not 
just from the Lebanese state, but also from Hizballah and others such as Fadlallah, all citizens 
are equal and there is no differentiation between the different religions and sects. 
Nevertheless, they still considered the town to be Shiite, despite the presence of Christians. It 
is a fact that the majority are Shiites and this is reflected in the composition of the baladiyya 
with a Shiite as its leader, so there was no hesitation on part of any of those I talked to in 
Khiam about labelling the town Shiite. Whereas other towns and villages have been labelled 
‘mixed’, this was never used when describing Khiam. 
It is difficult for me to assess the relative pre-eminence of the different Shiite ‘sources of 
emulation’ (marājiʿ) the Shiites adhere to in Khiam, for several reasons. The question of who 
one chooses as ones marjiʿ is personal, therefore it is not a question one would just ask 
strangers. I did however ask my sources from Fadlallah’s organization about who among 
these marājiʿ they considered to have influence among the population. They mentioned 
Fadlallah, Khamenei and Sistani, in addition to Shirazi, a reference to Muḥammad al-Shirāzī 
who is an Iraqi born ayatollah living in Qum, Iran. 
In Khiam, Fadlallah has two offices, one is the sponsors’ (takafful), office, mainly charged 
with getting sponsors for orphans through the Mabarrat, and the other is his legal (sharʿī) 
office. They are situated close to each other at the main square of the town. Besides these two 
offices, the Mabarrat runs the Maryam bin ʿĪsā school, with close to one hundred employees 
and several hundred pupils.76 
This presence is considerable, but one of the reasons it is difficult to give an actual assessment 
of the number of followers is the fact that Fadlallah does not set as a condition for working in 
his organization that one should be an emulator (muqallid) of his. This was pointed out to me 
on several occasions, not least when I inquired about the relations between Hizballah and 
Fadlallah. I was then informed, as I had been on other occasions, that there were many 
                                               
76
 According to the staff  at the sponsors office in Khiam. 
48 
 
members of the party working in Fadlallah’s organization, and that likewise there are many 
members of the party who are emulators of Fadlallah.77 
Another factor is that many people are not very concerned with choosing a marjiʿ to follow. 
They are Shiites, but maybe not very religious, or they just follow whoever the elders of their 
family follow. This point was underlined to me by an employee at the legal office in Khiam, 
who lamented the fact that so many did not have a conscious view on this matter. For her, a 
native of Khiam who had stayed there during the Israeli occupation of the town, Fadlallah was 
the obvious choice as her marjiʿ. ‘He is ours, he is a local, of course we should choose him!’ 
Despite the presence of two offices and a big school in the town, one thing surprised me. One 
of my sources told me he was on his way to the mosque to attend the Friday prayers. I asked 
him how this worked, would the khuṭbat al-jumʿa, Friday speech, of Fadlallah, which he 
himself delivered in his mosque in Beirut be read out, or would there be a separate speech 
given in this mosque. ‘We don’t have our own mosque here, so I’ll go and pray in one of the 
other mosques,’ he told me, while assuring me that he would read Fadlallah’s speech later. 
For an organization of Fadlallah’s magnitude it seemed strange to me that they should not 
have their own mosque, but he told me that he did not think it mattered: ‘We just go to some 
of the others and pray, we all know each other.’ I asked if Hizballah had a mosque in town, 
which he confirmed that they had, along with one another, which I presumed was supported 
by the Higher Shiite Council, which is often seen as being closer to the Amal movement. The 
Amal movement has Sistani as its declared marjiʿ.78 
Other charity organizations are also present in Khiam, including those belonging to Hizballah 
such as the ʾImdād ʾImām al-Khumaynī and the Islamic Relief Committee, besides the ones 
that are close to Amal. A common sight in shops around town was an array of collection 
boxes from the different organizations lined up close to the cashier. The Islamic Relief 
Committee was perhaps the most visible, as they run a small clinic and an ambulance service 
based just opposite the offices of Fadlallah in the main square.79 
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5.9 The role of external actors 
There are several external actors who in different ways have a clear impact on the lives of the 
inhabitants of Khiam. It seems unproblematic to state that it is Israel who has had the biggest 
and most profound impact of all. 
Given the proximity to the Blue Line, which marks the ceasefire line between Lebanon and 
Israel, Khiam has felt the presence of the Israeli state, even from before its establishment in 
1948. Older people I spoke with claimed that local Lebanese families had sold land they 
owned in Palestine to ‘the Jews’ and several also related the story of a massacre committed by 
the Haganah in the neighbouring village of Houla just before Israel declared its independence. 
Then came the flow of Palestinian refugees following that declaration, many of whom sought 
shelter in villages close to the Blue Line, including Khiam, before being relocated to camps in 
other parts of the country. After the Arab League adopted the Cairo agreement in 1969, the 
whole south of Lebanon felt the impact of Palestinian guerrilla forces that started to use the 
area to attack Israel. In many ways this polarized the population here. While young men from 
the towns and villages signed up to join the different guerrilla groups, it was the general 
population who suffered the most from the Israeli reprisals that would follow an attack. 
Resentment grew at the way these Palestinian groups behaved towards the local population. 
Many I spoke with still felt a deep resentment towards the Palestinians because of this. In 
1978, just three years after the outbreak of the civil war in the country, the Israelis invaded the 
south of Lebanon with the declared aim of uprooting the guerrilla groups. However, the 
Israelis stayed on, occupying what they called a security zone for the next twenty-two years. 
To manage their occupation they took advantage of the civil war, and managed to get a 
Lebanese Army Major, Saʿd Ḥaddād, to defect and subsequently lead an Israeli sponsored 
army, the South Lebanese Army. The SLA continued to operate in the Israeli occupied zone 
until 2000, when the Israelis withdrew and left the SLA to fend for themselves. 
I had the opportunity to talk to some of those who had served in the SLA, and the story each 
related was almost always the same. In the wake of the withdrawal, they surrendered to 
Hizballah. After being interrogated by them, they were handed over to Lebanese authorities 
who handed down sentences of 3 months in jail to all of them. After serving their sentences, 
they returned and continued their lives in Khiam and the surrounding villages. One of these 
former soldiers could not praise Hizballah, or rather Hassan Nasrallah, enough, as he said he 
had been very afraid and had expected a far harsher treatment from the party. Others would 
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also acknowledge that the treatment they got in the wake of the SLA collapse was fine, ‘mnīḥ’ 
– but it soon emerged that they were not happy with their present situation, suffering from 
economic hardship and the feeling of being completely sidelined. As one put it: ‘When the 
Israelis came, we did not do like them [referring to the Shiites of whom many fled], we stayed 
because our land is so important for us. What could we do?’ Yet others had relatives who had 
still not returned after fleeing to Israel, fearing long prison sentences should they return, a 
situation which seemed to be a source of agony for many. ‘Why should they not be allowed to 
return and [be] given the sentences we were, after all, think about what others have done 
during the war, and nothing happened to them!’ By this he was clearly hinting at the many 
politicians who went from being warlords to politicians after the war.80 
‘Shukran Qaṭar’, the slogan which could be seen all over Lebanon in the summer of 2008, 
had an extra dimension to its meaning in Khiam. Everyone I met expressed their gratitude to 
the little Gulf state, not just for bringing a temporal end to the internal strife in the country,81 
but most of all for the reconstruction efforts it undertook in Khiam. Along with Bint Jbeil, 
ʿAinata and ʿAita Shaab, Khiam was promised rebuilding by the Qatari authorities, along with 
mosques and churches all over the south. The reconstruction efforts differed from those 
undertaken by other countries, in that the aid was distributed directly to the locals and did not 
go via the Lebanese government.82 When I first visited the town some two years after the end 
of the war, an estimated 70% of the reconstruction was complete but work was still ongoing.  
The other main source of reconstruction aid for Khiam is Iran, with the Islamic Republic 
promising to rebuild all roads that were destroyed, not just in Khiam and its vicinity but for 
the whole of south Lebanon. Their efforts were also praised, and as with Qatar, the aid was 
distributed directly in cooperation with the baladiyya. Iranian influence was of course seen in 
many other fields, from pictures of Khamenei in prominent spots, to ambulances donated by 
the Islamic Republic.  
 
5.10 Perceived solutions  
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5.10.1      ‘It must come from above’ 
Given that everyone I spoke to perceived there to be some kind of a problem relating to the 
state and its weak presence in Khiam, and indeed to the state itself on part of many, what 
could be perceived to be the solution, or a solution? ‘You know, it’s like when you are 
washing the stairs, you have to start from the top and work your way down. The same is the 
case for our state; change has to come from the top.’ Without identifying a clear solution, my 
source was very clear as to how change should come about, thus clearly stating that the 
problems experienced by the population of Khiam were not only local, but had to do with the 
state itself. I asked him if his answer should be understood in the way that he wanted regime 
change, or a change of political system, but he refrained from giving a clear answer to that, 
instead pointing to the responsibility of the politicians to start behaving in a way that would 
benefit the whole country, not just Beirut and its surroundings or this or that sect, ṭāʾifa. 
By this statement he also touched on a point many others would mention, not when talking 
about what they perceived to be the problems, but when asked about what they saw as the (or 
a) solution to their problems. ‘The problem is that as soon as a problem arises, everyone will 
turn to their sects for a solution, not to the state. The idea of a homeland, waṭan, is still weak 
around here, and it is a serious problem.’ Few if any would mention sectarianism as a problem 
initially, but when we discussed solutions, it would come up again and again as something 
that would need to be dealt with as part of any solution. 
 
5.10.2 Hudna ṭawīla and peace between Syria and Israel 
When asking people about their relations with, and view of, the Lebanese state, few if any 
mentioned anything about the conflict with Israel as part of their problems. However, when 
asked about what they perceived to be a solution to their problems, many would mention, 
some even as the foremost priority, a solution to this conflict. One of my sources told me 
immediately that there would be no solution to their problems with the Lebanese state as long 
as the conflict with Israel is ongoing. His desire for a solution was clear, there needed to be a 
peace agreement, ittifāq salām, between Israel and Syria, and a long-term ceasefire (hudna 
ṭawīla) between Lebanon and Israel. Before these two agreements were in place he claimed 
there would not be any improvement in the lives of the inhabitants of Khiam and the rest of 
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the country for that matter. He told me this in private, and his answer is significant in several 
ways. By implying the need for a solution to the conflict between Syria and Israel, he 
recognized the impact these two states, and their conflict, have on Lebanon. It also implies 
that a solution to local problems, should at least partly be found outside Lebanon. It is also 
significant in that this source, who is affiliated with Fadlallah, said frankly that he wanted a 
peace agreement between Syria and Israel, a call seldom heard from any Shiites. He stopped 
short of calling for a peace accord between Israel and Lebanon, but when I asked him about it, 
he said that he believed the ceasefire should be the first step towards such an agreement. 
Others clearly recognized the impact of these two conflicts on their situation, but none went 
as far as calling for a peace agreement or even a ceasefire. On the other hand, no-one said that 
the destruction of Israel or the ‘liberation of Palestine’ is a prerequisite for solving their 
problems. Some would mention the possibility of some kind of an agreement with Israel, but 
then only as a result of the ‘others’ recognizing the Israeli state through peace agreements 
between the Palestinians and Israel and the Arab peace initiative. 
Resignation was a common attitude when I asked them about how they perceived a solution 
to their problems. ‘It doesn’t matter what I think, no-one would listen to me anyhow,’ is the 
answer I got from a woman working in Fadlallah’s organization. Variants of this answer were 
given by many, but the reasons for it varied. Some were clearly reluctant to reveal their ideas 
or stances, and explicitly said so, while others seemed genuinely convinced that what they 
might have to say about it did not matter.  
5.10.3 Opposition forces in Khiam 
When I spoke with people about the presence of other political groups than Hizballah and 
Amal, they would simply say that there was no-one in town supporting such groups at all. Nor 
were there any visible signs of their presence around town in the form of posters, banners and 
the like. It was only later that I learned that they were actually there, and this in the form of a 
newspaper article about an official of the Lebanese Option Group (Tayyār al-intimāʾ al-
lubnānī) whose car had been set on fire at night by unknown attackers. This was the second 
time within a month that the official, ʿAṣām al-ʿAbd Allāh, was the victim of such an attack.83 
In the elections held in June 2009, candidates of parties opposed to Hizballah got quite a few 
votes, but not many compared to Khalil, who secured another term as MP for Khiam. 
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Based on my observations in Khiam, no-one questioned the role of the Islamic Resistance. 
They were seen as the only force who could protect the inhabitants against the Israelis, but 
also as the only force who could uphold order in the town. Statements about the need for a 
peace agreement between Syria and Israel and a long time truce between Lebanon and Israel 
might be seen as contradicting this. However, I will not draw that conclusion. While it is 
clearly a sign of war fatigue and an indication that not all are willing to sacrifice either their 
lives or their belongings time and again in confrontations with Israel, there are other 
considerations. Foremost of these is that Israel is still considered to be the aggressor and the 
source of the problem.  
Civil society organizations, such as various charity groups, were seen a filling a gap made by 
the state’s absence, but by many also as preferable to the state. This was expressed in 
particular when talking about education. The Fadlallah-run school was viewed as offering 
better facilities and a higher quality of education than the government-run school. It is worth 
noting that all but one of these organizations belong to groups loyal to the resistance.84 Even 
though Fadlallah’s organization stressed that they were also providing assistance to others 
than the Shiite community, this was limited to a single Druze family in Ibl during the time I 
was there. 
Concerning the question of representation, it was taken for granted that the town would be 
represented on a national level by Khalil. At the local level, the baladiyya, everyone seemed 
satisfied with its present leader, but I have to add that this was not a topic I heard much about. 
I find it strange that the car of an opponent should be attacked in the way it was, as there was 
such an overwhelming support for the Hizballah-Amal alliance. It could be seen as a warning 
to opposing forces not to challenge this hegemony, even if it is unlikely that they would 
constitute a serious challenge to it. In the villages surrounding Khiam, the presence of other 
forces was visible, but only after the war in 2006, when the Islamic Resistance was forced to 
reconsider its modus operandi. From 2000 they had been the sole military force in the south, 
UNIFIL presence at the time was limited and the Lebanese Army was not deployed in the 
south. While not being willing to alienate the population in these villages further by attacking 
                                               
84
 The only other such charity who operates there is the Jabal Amel Foundation, which have no political agenda 
whatsoever. 
54 
 
opposing forces there, an attack on them in Khiam could also be interpreted as a warning to 
these forces outside the town. 
 
5.10.4 A local hegemony 
If we measure these findings against the hegemony theory I presented in 2.6, I make the 
argument that Hizballah has a hegemony over the affairs of this local community. On the state 
level, which includes the military, the presence of the Lebanese state is very limited. It is 
Hizballah, through its Islamic Resistance, that has succeeded in convincing people that it is 
only them who are able to defend the community against outside aggression, and by 
extension, it is the one able to uphold order in the town. Given the limited presence of the 
state, it is civil society organizations that are the ones that have the economic means to 
provide services to the population, from education to material aid. While several different 
charities operate in Khiam, none of these challenge this hegemony. Amal should in my view 
not be seen as a challenge to Hizballah – rather they operate in coordination. They accept the 
hegemony of Hizballah and operate within its limits. Groups, or rather the group, which did 
not comply with this, was not only sidelined but actively sabotaged. On a religious level it is 
important to note that despite the fact that Khiam was originally a mixed town with a 
Christian population, it is treated as and considered to be a Muslim town.  
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6 Hizballah 
 
6.1 Assessing the policies of Hizballah 
As stated in the introduction of this thesis, the differences in how Hizballah, their policies and 
their goals have been analysed can be traced back to the first elections after the end of the 
civil war, in which Hizballah after lengthy internal debates chose to participate. In this chapter 
I will start the analysis by giving an insight into the ideological foundations of the groups that 
came to form Hizballah, and how this is expressed in their ‘manifesto’, ‘The Open Letter to 
the Oppressed in Lebanon and on Earth’ (Al-risāla al-maftūḥa lil-mustaḍʿafīn fī Lubnān wa 
al-ʿālam). In conjunction with this, I will use a communiqué from the party  to show that what 
it enforced on the ground was not always in conformity with its stated policies, but rather 
aimed at building an ‘Islamic order’ on the ground. Then I will discuss how participation in 
elections could be viewed in another way than as an acceptance of the Lebanese political 
system, i.e. mainly as a means to broaden the legitimacy of their main priority, the Islamic 
Resistance, and to expand and solidify their hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. Their 
commitment to the wilāyat al-faqīh doctrine will also by discussed. 
The last part is devoted to the events of 7 May, 2008, in which Hizballah used their armed 
forces to occupy west Beirut and the mountains. How should these actions be understood, as 
an expression of strength or rather a hegemony in decline? 
 
 
6.1.1 The origins of Hizballah 
Without going into great detail about the formation of Hizballah, there are a couple of 
important factors which should be addressed, that is the roles played by Musa al-Sadr and 
Fadlallah respectively. 
These two clerics had a profound impact on this process, albeit on different levels. Musa al-
Sadr was important in that he was the one who started to organize the Lebanese Shiites as 
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Shiites, whereas Fadlallah was important as he was the one who provided the ideological 
foundation for the party, through his religious seminaries. 
Al-Sadr formed The Movement of the Deprived (Ḥarakat al-maḥrumīn) to address the 
grievances of the Shiites, in 1974. As a staunch anti-communist, it is natural to think that at 
least part of his motivation was to counter the influence of leftist parties and not least the 
Communist Party, who like other communist parties in the region and especially in Iraq, 
included many Shiites.85 A year later, the armed wing of the movement was founded, ʾAfwāj 
al-Muqāwama al-Lubnāniyya, known by its acronym AMAL. While al-Sadr himself was a 
cleric, Amal did not have a declared religious agenda, nor did it have a leadership composed 
mainly of clerics. Still, it appealed to many young, religious men who did not find it natural to 
join one of the Palestinian or leftist groups, to which a majority of the Shiites who took up 
arms at the beginning of the war belonged.86 
When the Islamic Revolution in Iran came in 1979, many young Lebanese embraced it fully, 
including a number of religious students who were members of Amal. It is important to bear 
in mind that just six months before, al-Sadr had disappeared while on a trip to Libya, 
presumably murdered by the Libyan leader al-Qadhdhāfī. His disappearance evoked the 
memory of the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, and when Khomeini triumphantly returned 
to Iran, it created a religious fervour among many Shiites in Lebanon. Many would 
subsequently leave Amal to join the new party. 
These developments coincided with the expulsion of many Lebanese students from the 
religious seminaries in Najaf, who had started their studies in the seminaries of Fadlallah. On 
their return to Lebanon, some of these went on to form a Lebanese branch of the Daʿwa 
party.87 Other Islamist organizations, such as the Lebanese Muslim Student’s Union, already 
existed.  
When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the nucleus of the new organization was already in 
place. Many of these former students happened to be in Teheran at the time of the invasion, 
where Fadlallah was also present. They met with Khomeini, who urged them to return home 
and fight the invaders. More importantly, he promised them concrete help. Units of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards were dispatched to Lebanon to train recruits for the new 
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resistance, and offered vital support in the founding of Hizballah. The Guards took the village 
of Brital in the Bekaa as their headquarters: this is the home of Subhi Tufayli, who became 
the first Secretary-General of the party.88 Among the ‘graduates’ from the first training camp 
they set up we find Abbas al-Mussawi and Muhammad Raad [Muḥammad Raʿd], the second 
Secretary-General and present leader of Hizballah’s parliamentary block respectively. 
 
6.1.2 The Open Letter 
It took three years from these events until the party officially declared its existence, and this 
was done by the former Amal representative to Teheran, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid [ʾIbrāhīm 
ʾAmīn al-Sayyid]. At a press conference on 16 February, 1985 he presented the manifesto of 
the party, ‘The Open Letter to the Oppressed in Lebanon and on Earth’ (Al-risāla al-maftūḥa 
lil-mustaḍʿafīn fī Lubnān wa al-ʿālam). 
This document is important because it presents the ideological foundation of the party, its 
world-view and how it viewed the Lebanese state. While Hizballah later issued electoral 
programmes89 and, lately, a policy document,90 the Open Letter remains the only document 
which could be called a manifesto. 
‘We are the sons of the Nation of God’s Party in Lebanon’ the letter starts, and goes on to say 
that they consider themselves to be a part of the Muslim Nation in the world, ‘which is facing 
the most ferocious imperialist attack, (ʾaʿtā hajmat al-istikbāriyya),  from both the West and 
the East, with the aim of emptying it [the ʾumma] of its missionary content, (bi-hadaf 
tafrīghhā min maḍmūnihā al-rasālī),91 which God bestowed upon it, to be the best of nations 
brought to the people, to promote virtue and prevent vice... we are the sons of God’s Party, 
whose vanguard God made victorious in Iran, and who anew founded the core of the central 
Islamic State in the world... we obey the orders of one leadership, just and righteous, 
represented by the jurist-consult... materialized at present by the Imam the Grand Guide ʾAyat 
Allāh Rūḥ Allāh al-Mūsawī al-Khumaynī...’.92 
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This is the main content of the first three paragraphs of the letter, in which they emphasize 
that they are the sons of a nation under attack, wanting to uphold a holy mission and submit 
themselves to the wilāyat al-faqīh. The emphasis on being under attack is a thread through the 
letter, and again and again the adherence to wilāyat al-faqīh is reiterated. It states that their 
choice is confrontation: ‘We see that the aggression can not be met [with anything] except 
with sacrifices; dignity will not be present except with the sacrifice of blood...’ 
The letter identifies their main enemies: America, France, Israel and the Phalangists, who are 
accused of being an essential part of the Zionist plot of which they are the victims. Those who 
choose to cooperate in the so-called Salvation Front,93 practically all other Lebanese 
politicians, are denounced as part of this project, but the harshest attacks are reserved for the 
Phalangists. 
Under the heading ‘Our goals in Lebanon’ four major goals are listed. First, to drive Israel out 
of Lebanon, as a forerunner to removing its existence, and to liberate Jerusalem from 
occupation. Second, to drive America, France and their allies out of Lebanon and to end any 
influence of any imperialist state in the country. Thirdly, to submit the Phalangists to just 
judgement and put them to trial for the crimes they have committed against Muslims and 
Christians with support from America and Israel. Fourth, to grant ‘to all sons of our people 
[the right] to decide their destiny, and to choose in freedom the kind of ruling system they 
like, knowing that we do not lessen our commitment to the rule of Islam and we call on all to 
choose the rule of Islam, which alone guaranties justice and dignity for all, and which alone 
prevents any attempt to spread imperialism in our country again’. 
After this paragraph follows a section to ‘our friends’, calling on the downtrodden of the 
earth,  all those who fight their enemies, to join them in fulfilling the greater goal of ending 
American hegemony over the country. ‘It is not important if a party controls a street, but the 
important is that the masses, al-jamāhīr, interact with the Party. It is not important if the 
citizen is facing increased militarization... but the important [thing] is that the operations 
against Israel increase.’ It is not important that these friends may not be Muslims, as their 
motives are considered as being originally Islamic. Again they state their commitment to 
Islam, but say that they will not force it on anyone, as political Maronism was enforced on 
them at the time. The letter repeatedly calls on all to accept Islam on a personal, political and 
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social level, stating that there will be no alternative outweighing Islam, and that the least they 
are willing to accept concerning the realization of their goals, is to rescue Lebanon from 
subordination, to the West or to the East, to remove the Zionist occupation from their lands, 
and the authorization of a system decided upon by the people. 
When assessing the letter, one should of course remember that it was issued in the midst of 
the civil war, when Israel was occupying parts of the country. It is however clear what the 
main pillars of the party are: the commitment to wilāyat al-faqīh and to promoting an Islamic 
system, the fight against Israel, and the conception that they are fighting a larger, imperialist 
hegemony over Lebanon. While they state clearly that they will not use force to implement 
their preferred Islamic system, it remains unclear what their reaction will be in the case of the 
majority refusing it.  
 
6.1.3 The Islamic republic in Lebanon 
While this was the stated policy of Hizballah, in the shadows they were preparing for an 
Islamic republic in Lebanon. There are documents that demonstrate the intention to form such 
a republic. One of these is a book called A View to the Proposal of the Islamic Republic in 
Lebanon (Naẓra ʿalā ṭaruḥ al-jumhūriyya al-ʾislāmiyya fī lubnān). The writer is presented as 
Muḥammad Zuʿaytir, but as I could not find any reference to him anywhere else than in this 
book, I asked several Lebanese scholars about him and they all said that this was an alias used 
by Hizballah.94 There are also many indications in the book that support this view, for 
instance in the chapter called ‘The Resistance is a means, not an end’ the role of the resistance 
is discussed, displaying what seems to be a disagreement within the movement, at one point 
‘those who continue to hold celebrations and festivities under the name The Islamic 
Resistance’95 are criticized for not making a strong enough effort to remove the ‘Maronite 
regime’. Later in the book, under the heading ‘Who is the leader?’, a religious justification for 
the wilāyat al-faqīh is given and Khomeini is pointed to as the Imam and leader.96 Apparently 
they did not want to disclose who really wrote this book, which is not surprising, taking the 
content of it into consideration.  
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While the Open Letter stated that an Islamic state would not be enforced on the Lebanese 
against their will, the book argues that the Crusader-Zionist presence on the land of Islam 
(Lebanon) should be removed, along with the Maronite hegemony and its influence.97 The 
Maronites are given the blame for all the ills that have befallen the country for hundreds of 
years; they are even blamed for the massacres of 1860, when they were massacred in the 
thousands!98 
‘Any Muslim who lives under the shadow of an un-Islamic rule, will every hour be exposed 
to violation of the Islamic rules, as long as the laws that are to be followed are not Islamic...’99 
This is arguing that it is impossible for a Muslim to live under any other rule than an Islamic 
one. To give us an idea about this rule, the author states that ‘The System of Islamic rule is 
not only cutting the hand of the thief or the flogging of the adulterer and the drinker of 
alcohol... rather it is also a system for social, political, and economic relations...’ In other 
words, it is a system encompassing all aspects of life. 
The writer dismisses the idea that Muslims constitute a sect among other sects, but states that 
‘we are above the sects and above the parties’.100 Similarly, he says: ‘We will not demand 
anything from the Maronites, because we want everything. So it is not sufficient to change 
this president or a director of that ministry, because the matter is first and last that the 
legitimacy should be extended from the Quran and the Sunna, the issue of rule and politics are 
the prerogatives of Islam, which it is not possible for anyone to sacrifice.’ It would be difficult 
not to take from these statements that nothing short of an Islamic system of rule is acceptable. 
It is clearly said that the only solution for Lebanon is to erect an Islamic system and all talks 
and discussions about it is dismissed out of hand. Given that this book was released several 
years after the Open Letter, and while aiming at the same goal, it prescribes a different way of 
reaching it. The question then is, how sincerely should one take the statements from the Open 
Letter that force will not be used to achieve their goal of a complete hegemony over Lebanon? 
 
6.1.4 The Islamic order 
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An illuminating case is a communiqué issued by the Committee for the Revival of the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prohibition of the Vice (lajnat ʾiḥyāʾ al-ʾamr bi al-mʿarūf wa al-
nahy ʿan al-munkar), which was distributed in the southern suburbs of Beirut in 1990.101 It is 
significant in that it paints a picture of the way Hizballah considers the areas under their 
control as Islamic, despite having an originally mixed population. They ignore the fact that 
sections of the Muslim population define themselves as secularists, and demonstrate that they 
find it justifiable to order the population to comply with orders such as: 
– ‘Dressing modestly in order to preserve the Islamic atmosphere that has to thrive in the 
society of the Muslims, and as a reminder always that we live in Islamic areas, not in the 
country of unbelief and idolatry’; 
– ‘not to arrange parties that are forbidden and cause insult to others, not to raise the sound of 
singing, either from [private] houses or cars’; 
– forbidding card playing; 
– forbidding the sale, buying, and use of alcohol and drugs. 
These regulations are still upheld today in the parts of the country under the control of the 
party, maybe not as uncompromisingly as they used to be, but they are still in force. One will 
not find alcohol for sale in these districts and there is no open card playing or partying. In the 
first week of October 2009, a group of Brazilian samba dancers were prevented from 
performing in Tyre by local clerics, on the grounds that their performance was pornographic, 
and it did not help that the dancers promised to cover their bodies.102 Concerning the use of 
modest dress, the party has obviously had to moderate its stance in this respect following 
great unwillingness from the population at large to comply with this particular order.   
The communiqué demonstrates that the party did not shy away from issuing orders and 
enforcing their views on others, contrary to their official policy as stated in the Open Letter. 
This was done under the pretext that these areas are ‘Islamic’. Instead of erecting an Islamic 
republic or a parallel state, these actions indicate that they wanted a kind of Islamic order in 
the Shiite parts of the country they controlled. This was not done just by promoting virtue and 
preventing vice but also by building institutions to care for the needs of the population in 
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these areas. Schools, hospitals and a network of charity organizations were established there, 
some controlled directly by Hizballah, others by Fadlallah or the Higher Shiite Council. 
 
6.2 Parliamentarian participation 
The question is then: did these views and practices change with the end on the civil war, and 
the subsequent participation of Hizballah in the parliamentary elections in 1992? Below I will 
look at the motives behind participation, and how they justified participation in a system they 
had sworn to annihilate just a few years earlier. 
As mentioned above, the question of participation in these elections was a difficult one for 
Hizballah, and led to a split in the party. Their decision to participate is also the single most 
important event for the proponents of the view that a genuine shift occurred in the party’s 
politics. A closer look at the motives behind participation raises doubts about such a shift. 
This is because it does not represent a recognition of the system, rather a willingness to work 
within it as long as Hizballah's own priorities are best served this way.  
Naim Qasem writes that participation means taking part in the existing political system but it 
does not represent a commitment to preserving the system as it is, nor to defend its 
deficiencies or mistakes. Rather it is viewed as a place to represent a group of the people, and 
the issue of the system itself is open for debate. It does not demand an acceptance, or in his 
words ‘an oath of allegiance’, to the system.103 
The discussion then becomes one of weighing the advantages against the disadvantages, and 
here it is the Islamic Resistance which has the highest priority for Hizballah. This is clearly 
reflected in the considerations they made, in which the first advantage for participation in 
elections is given as: ‘benefitting from the parliament as a political pulpit concerning the 
Resistance and its affairs, discussing support and aid for it... to let others hear the voice of the 
Resistance from the point of popular, parliamentarian representation’.104 One of the other 
advantages is that it will give recognition from one of the institutions of the Lebanese system 
to the representation by MPs of a particular section of the people, which makes the Islamic 
Resistance a part of the ‘fabric’ recognized both officially and popularly. 
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Qasem is very clear when discussing this participation that in his view it is the Islamic 
Resistance that takes priority, not parliamentary work. The latter is only viewed as 
meaningful as long as it benefits the Islamic Resistance, and acceptable only as long as it is 
not demanded of the party to recognize the system itself.  
The overarching question in this respect, about the legitimacy of participating in a system that 
does not correspond to the party’s view of an Islamic system, was not discussed. According to 
Qasem, this question was of such magnitude that it was left for the walī al-faqīh to decide, 
and this brings us to the relationship between Hizballah and the doctrine of wilāyat al-faqīh. 
 
6.3 Wilāyat al-faqīh 
From its very inception, Hizballah declared their commitment to the doctrine of wilāyat al-
faqīh, and to Khomeini as the sole political leader of the Muslimʾumma. Above was given one 
example of questions referred to the faqih to decide upon, but what are the repercussions of 
this commitment, and how does the party define the prerogatives of the reigning faqīh? 
Again Qasem is a valuable source, as he devotes a chapter in his book to this doctrine, 
because it is the religious and ideological fundament of the party. The faqīh is the 
representative of the hidden twelfth Imam on earth, and as such is the leader of the Muslim 
ʾumma. He is the one responsible for effectuating the Islamic rulings and the one who decides 
peace or war, as well as the greater political decisions.105 A distinction is made from the 
emulation of a marjiʿ in personal matters, because all political powers belong to the wali. So 
if a believer chooses to emulate Fadlallah in questions relating to personal matters, that is 
acceptable, as long as he or she defers to the walī al-faqīh for the general guidance of the 
Muslim ʾumma. 
At the same time it is made clear that it is the responsibility of Hizballah to implement these 
rulings, and here the party has great flexibility. They are the ones who know the local 
situation and therefore better suited to do this, and in cases of uncertainty of disagreement, 
they will defer to the faqīh for a legal ruling. A typical question of great importance such as 
participation in elections was therefore referred to Khamenei for a decision. As soon as his 
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blessing of participation was given, it was up to the party to choose how to implement it. 
They were the ones who formed the election programme and the electoral alliances, and chose 
candidates and strategy. 
In questions of principal, they will have to obey the rulings of the faqīh, such as in the 
question of erecting an Islamic state. Here there is no room for negotiation. The erecting of 
such a state is not considered to be a political decision, but a legally binding obligation.106 
This could not be taken to mean that it will be enforced on anyone. As stated above it is 
Hizballah who decides how it should be implemented, but there is no room to leave behind 
this goal.  
The adherence to wilāyat al-faqīh is transnational, in the sense that the nationality of the faqīh 
is not important, according to Hizballah. On the other hand, he is the one who supervises and 
guides the Islamic Republic in Iran, while at the same time demarcating the political duties of 
Muslims in the rest of the world. In their view, this is two sides of the same coin, but one 
could imagine a situation where the interests of Iran are not necessarily those of Lebanon. If 
such a situation should arise, this would imply that Hizballah would side with Iran, as the 
Islamic Republic. One such scenario could be an attack on the nuclear facilities in Iran, where 
Hizballah will form a part of the retaliatory force of the Islamic Republic.  This is a point of 
great concern for many critics of Hizballah. It does not imply that Hizballah is an Iranian 
party. Its leaders, members and supporters are Lebanese, and they operate in a Lebanese 
environment. Rather one should appreciate the religious bonds as the basis of their 
relationship, for Hizballah the idea of wilāyat al-faqīh is part of the article of faith.107 In this 
view, an attack on Iran is considered an attack on Islam itself, and should therefore be 
countered. 
Another implication of this adherence is the aid which the party receives from the Islamic 
Republic. The Islamic Resistance is equipped by Iran, and many of Hizballah’s organizations 
are in fact branches of an Iranian mother organization, such as the Martyr’s Foundation 
(Muʾassasat al-Shahīd). Hizballah has never denied this aid but they are unwilling to unveil 
how much it constitutes. Nizar Hamzeh estimated that the party receives the value of one 
billion U.S. dollars annually directly from Iran. This figure does not include the funds for the 
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Islamic Resistance, which he estimates as being higher.108 In addition to this comes the 
religious taxes the party collects from emulators of Khamenei, the zakāt and the khums. They 
are allowed to spend these taxes as they see fit, and have used them to build an impressive 
structure of organizations to provide services for their constituency. These range from clinics 
and hospitals to a construction company and media outlets. 
 
6.4 Polarization in Lebanon 
The dual modus operandi, participating in parliament while focusing on the Islamic 
Resistance, worked well for Hizballah in the years from 1992 to 2005. In 2000, the Israelis 
withdrew from the areas they occupied in south Lebanon, and for the party this represented a 
peak in their popular support. The withdrawal was not seen as complete, given that two small 
pockets were still occupied by the Israelis, so the Lebanese Army did not deploy in the south. 
Hizballah thus became the sole armed Lebanese presence there, which they used to fortify 
their positions and prepare for the next war with the Israelis. It also allowed them to cement 
their civil presence there, along with other forces loyal to the resistance such as Fadlallah’s 
organization. 
When Rafiq al-Hariri [Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī], the former Prime Minister who had a rocky 
relationship with Hizballah, was murdered in 2005, this position of strength started to come 
under pressure. Syria was blamed by many Lebanese for being behind the murder, and they 
eventually had to withdraw their forces from Lebanon. This in turn affected Hizballah as the 
foremost of Syria’s allies in Lebanon, and the divisions over which path the country should 
follow were exacerbated. While tensions were brewing, a national unity government was 
formed, and Hizballah for the first time joined a government. At this time a number of 
politicians critical of Syria were assassinated, adding to the tense atmosphere and instability. 
The whole situation exploded in July 2006, as a result of a Hizballah operation in south 
Lebanon. The Islamic Resistance had entered Israel proper and abducted two Israeli soldiers, 
which in turn led Israel to launch a full scale war on Lebanon. Hizballah described the result 
as a ‘divine victory’, and was lauded by its allies for being able to stand up against Israeli 
military might. For the other side of the political divide in Lebanon the result was seen as a 
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disaster. The country was in ruins and much of the infrastructure was destroyed, but more 
importantly it became clear that the decision of war and peace was not in the hands of the 
Lebanese state but in the hands of Hizballah. 
 
These developments continued through 2006 and 2007 and now focused on the presidency. 
The term of staunchly pro-Syrian President Emile Lahoud [ʾImīl Laḥūd] had ended without 
an agreement on a new President, and Amal and Hizballah withdrew their ministers from the 
government and started a sit-in in downtown Beirut to try to pressurize the remainder of the 
government into resigning. They were joined by supporters of Michel Aoun [Mīshāl ʿAwn], a 
former general who had returned from exile in the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination. He had 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Hizballah in 2006,109 and quickly became one 
of their closest allies. The reason Aoun had for doing this is outside the scope of my thesis, 
but for Hizballah it proved that working with other forces through parliamentary participation 
was valuable. Without changing their policies they were able to boost the legitimacy of the 
Islamic Resistance among the Christian population. The sit-in was in many ways a success for 
Hizballah, and by withdrawing from the government they were able to paralyse parliamentary 
life in the country, and the sit-in blocked economic life in the country as well. 
 
6.5 The weapons used for internal political gains 
At the beginning of May 2008 the government led by Fuad Siniora [Fuʾād Sanyūra] adopted 
two different decisions concerning Hizballah. The first was to remove the head of security at 
Beirut International Airport and the second was to dismantle the communications network of 
Hizballah. These decisions were taken as a reaction to the assassinations of opponents of 
Syria and Hizballah. There had been a pattern where many of these took place immediately 
after the return of the victims from abroad, and it was discovered that the airport was 
surveilled by Hizballah. Hizballah interpreted these decisions as a declaration of war against 
them, and reacted by seizing control over the predominantly Sunni west Beirut and the Druze-
dominated Shouf mountains. They did what they had sworn would never happen, namely to 
use their weapons against other Lebanese for political gains. While the decisions by the 
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government of Siniora were undoubtedly aimed at Hizballah, it is difficult to see how they 
could have been effectuated. It would meant that the Lebanese Army would have had to enter 
into a confrontation with the party, something that was highly unlikely given that the 
commander of the Army at the time, Michel Suleiman [Mīshāl Sulaymān], was already 
agreed upon as the next President by all parties. He would not have risked his position by 
ordering a move against Hizballah, well aware that this would also lead to the disintegration 
of the Army. The crisis came to an end when the different factions went to Doha in Qatar and 
there agreed upon a formula to resolve it. This included the formation of a new government in 
which the Hizballah-led opposition was given a veto right, the new President was elected and 
the two decisions by the government which led to the confrontation were nullified. 
6.5.1 Repercussions 
While civil peace returned to the country in late May 2008, it was now basically split in two. 
On one side were Hizballah and its allies in Amal, who together with Aoun formed the main 
components of the opposition, known as the March 8 group. On the other side was the Future 
Movement, which had the support of the overwhelming majority of the Sunni community, the 
Druze under the leadership of Walid Joumblat [Walīd Junblāṭ]110 and the Christians party al-
Kataeb [al-Katāʾib] and the Lebanese Forces. Their grouping, called the March 14, had 
organized itself as a political front with a secretariat and an elected leadership. 
Nevertheless, the main result of these events was the consolidation and formalization of the 
strength of Hizballah. It broadened its legitimacy by entering into an alliance with Michel 
Aoun, kept its weapons outside the reach of the state and demonstrated that no political 
decision could be taken without their approval. While Hizballah does not put any emphasis at 
all on upholding an Islamic Order in non-Shiite parts of Lebanon, it would not accept that any 
political force could challenge its weapons, nor its position as the strongest party in the 
country. This was expressed in such statements as that of Nawaf al-Mussawi [Nawāf al-
Mūsawī], the man responsible for international relations in Hizballah, who said that no person 
who distrusts the Islamic Resistance will be appointed to head any security apparatus or to 
any military position.111 
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Another indication that their military domination was expanding came in August 2008, when 
fighters from the Islamic Resistance shot down a Lebanese Army helicopter in the Sujud area. 
The war in 2006 ended with UN resolution 1701, which ended Hizballah’s open military 
presence south of the Litani River. This meant that they expanded into areas previously not 
under their control, such as Sujud, which is situated between Jezzine and Marjayoun. The 
fighter who shot down the helicopter claimed that they mistook it for an Israeli military 
helicopter out to attack them. Hizballah came under pressure to submit their fighter to the 
Lebanese judiciary, which they eventually did, but he was released again shortly after. This 
created an uproar among their political opponents, and the family of the murdered soldier said 
that it was like their son being killed twice.112 However, the case did not seem to have any 
repercussions for the Islamic Resistance, and the soldier was not prosecuted. 
The development of the party is remarkable. What had started out as small groups of devout 
followers of Khomeini managed to develop into the most powerful of all the Lebanese parties. 
One of the main reasons for this is their strong ideological foundation, which has given them 
the flexibility they need to operate in such a complex country as Lebanon. Furthermore, this 
ideological foundation provided Hizballah with political backing from a regional power, and 
it facilitated the economic backing needed to build up an infrastructure in the areas under their 
control. Through the same ideological foundation they had access to military aid and support. 
Without this it is doubtful they had managed to reach the position where they are. Another 
important reason is the structure of the party itself, which has been labelled Leninist by some 
scholars.113 Unlike many other groups they have by and large avoided showing internal 
differences and managed to display a unified position. Their Shiite constituency find 
themselves as the leading political force in the country for the first time since independence, 
which again has helped to strengthen Hizballah’s position among them, as it is thanks to the 
party they have arrived there.  
On this basis, and compared with what I wrote in 2.6, I argue that all the important conditions 
for a exerting hegemony is achieved. Hizballah has been able to provide a wide variety of 
services to the Shiite community, where the State has failed or been unable to do so. The code 
of conduct promoted by the Party is by and large observed in the Shiite parts of Lebanon. But 
most important, the vaste majority of Shiites view the  Islamic Resistance as the only force 
able to protect them from outside agression, and view the strategies pursued by the Party as 
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representing the interests of the community at large. By focusing on keeping the Resistance 
intact, and with strong Iranian support, Hizballah has managed to become an integral part of a 
regional counter hegemony to confront American and Western policies in the Middle East. 
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7 The views of Fadlallah 
The position of Fadlallah is disputed on several levels, especially concerning his relations 
with Hizballah. In the following I will try to clarify this position as well as his position as to 
what he considered to be the main flaws of the Lebanese state and what he perceived to be the 
solution to these flaws. I will also try to situate him on the Lebanese Shiite stage, and show 
how his positions have developed over the years, much in the same way as those of Hizballah, 
but his stances on certain issues such as the question of the Islamic Resistance (the armed 
wing of Hizballah) and the Islamic Republic of Iran have been consistent over the years. 
These positions are in total harmony with those of Hizballah, and also on many religious 
issues it is interesting to note that the same expressions are used by both. 
 
7.1 ‘Sectarianism is the main problem’ 
I explained to Fadlallah what I had found when talking to people in Khiam, and also thanked 
him for allowing me to conduct my research with the help of Mabarrat. When I asked him 
directly what he perceived to be the main problem for the Shiites of Lebanon in relation to the 
Lebanese state, the answer came swiftly. ‘Sectarianism , al-ṭāʾifiyya, is our main problem, not 
for the Shiites as such, but for all Lebanese. This is the root of the problem, and we need to 
solve it before we can have a functioning state.’114 He also mentioned other problems such as 
corruption, but was very clear about what he saw as the major problem. What is not so clear is 
the solution to this problem, but Fadlallah also came up with some statements in this respect 
which were very clear: ‘The biggest  ʿayb, mistake or sin would be for two of the sects to try 
to rule the country without the third,’ he said.115 
There are several ways to interpret this statement, but what is obvious is that Fadlallah was 
somehow manoeuvring within a discourse of sectarian representation. A civil state is not the 
same as a secular state, and Fadlallah was not an advocate of a secularized state in Lebanon. 
For Fadlallah, religion should form the basis of any state, in the Lebanese context with the 
cooperation between the different sects, and in the case of what is deemed as an Islamic or 
Muslim country, there should be established an Islamic state. 
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These views were repeated in an interview with the Lebanese magazine al-Shiraʿ, which I 
was invited to sit in on. In the interview he was asked about his position regarding the Doha 
agreement that ended the strife of May 2008. Fadlallah said that he views this accord in the 
same way as he views the Taif agreement that ended the civil war in 1990. ‘I have said that 
the Taif accord is not a solution to the problem of today, but it represents the end of the 
war...’116 He went on to say that as far as he is concerned that it represents a consolidation of 
the Taif agreement, i.e. sectarianism. In the same interview he stated that Lebanon will not be 
stable as long as the sectarian system (of the Taif agreement) persists.  
In the same interview that he gave to al-Shiraʿ, Fadlallah was very clear as to whom he 
considered to be the enemies, not only of Lebanon but of the region and the Arab and Islamic 
would at large: Israel, America and the West. Clearly he did not mean the entire West, 
something he was careful to point out to me as well, but he was still referring to the West as if 
it was a single entity. In one section of the interview he referred to a senior official from the 
Arab League who had told him that America’s goal is the destruction of Islam! This is quite 
representative of how he viewed the position of Islam in the world today, that the present era 
is a period of war – psychological, political, economic and in terms of security – between the 
West in general and the Islamic world, in a fundamental way.117 
 
7.2 The Solution: dawla madaniyya 
‘What we need is a civil state, dawla madaniyya, where everyone is treated equally regardless 
of their sectarian belonging.’ He went on to say that the biggest mistake, or sin, would be for 
two of the three main sects to build a state without the third. The main problem with these 
statements, in my view, is the lack of concrete ideas about what specific form this state would 
have, and how it would differ from the present Lebanese state.   
Fadlallah is part of a Shiite tendency, tayyār, which contends that Islam is both religion and 
state (dīn wa dawla), meaning that he is in principle in favour of establishing an Islamic state. 
In one of his main intellectual works, Islam and the Logic of Power (ʾIslām wa mantiq al-
quwwa), he argues for propagating this idea, even if it does not become a universally 
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supported one.118 There has been a clear development in the stances taken by him on the issue 
of establishing an Islamic state, with an early recognition that the very nature of Lebanese 
society would make it impossible under present circumstances to establish such a state. In the 
eighties he advocated a gradualist approach to the Islamic state, with the aim of creating the 
necessary conditions for it.119 Later on, he launched the idea of The State of Man(kind) 
(Dawlat al-ʾinsān), a state founded on common human values such as dignity and social 
justice.120 Again, it is difficult to grasp how he perceived what this state would actually be 
like, i.e. how it would differ from the current Lebanese state. Equally important in this respect 
is the fact that he saw this state not as an alternative but as a forerunner to the Islamic state.121 
The establishing of an Islamic state in Lebanon was not high on the agenda of Fadlallah, and 
had not been so for many years. Nevertheless, it was clear the he would have preferred the 
population at large, Christians included, to embrace the idea of an Islamic state. He made it 
very clear that this is not something that can be imposed on someone against their will, and it 
seems clear that the realities do not favour such a state. The ideal of such a state, however, 
continued to be a goal for the future.122 
In the same interview I referred to above, Fadlallah reiterated that the solution is al-
muwāṭana, the idea of a state that treats its citizens as fellows and does not discriminate 
against anyone on the basis of sectarian identity. He went on to say that the current system 
gives the impression (ʾawḥā) to every sect that it represents an independent entity within its 
districts. 
The problem with the idea of a civil state in the discourse of Fadlallah is that its implications 
remain unclear. For instance it is clear that such a state would mean that representation on the 
basis of sectarian identity would be abolished, but does this mean some kind of 
majoritarianism, where a perceived Shiite majority would install a government the other sects 
would have serious difficulties in accepting? The question is highly relevant if one looks at 
the present political alliances, where both Hizballah and Amal are allied with regional 
powers, Iran and Syria respectively, which other sections of the Lebanese population find 
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discomforting at best. So where did Fadlallah place himself in this national and regional 
landscape? 
 
7.3 Fadlallah and his relations with Hizballah 
There are differening views of the very nature of the relationship between Fadlallah and 
Hizballah. There are those who clearly see a major difference between the two and those who 
see them as being two different expressions of the same idea.  
Among those who see them as representing two separate trends, there is a tendency to stress 
the Arab identity of Fadlallah while using the relations between Hizballah and Iran as an 
indication of the latter’s ‘Iranian Shiism’.123 It is true that there were controversies between 
the two at times, and I will try to point to the most important of these. Before that, one should 
consider the origins of their relationship, which preceded the Iranian Revolution and the 
subsequent formation of Hizballah. 
As I have stated earlier, one of Fadlallah’s main concerns was to establish centres of Islamic 
learning in Lebanon, among them al-Maʿhad al-Shaʿrī al-ʾIslāmī in Beirut. He also taught at 
a centre in Baalbek established by Abbas al-Mussawi, who became the second Secretary-
General of Hizballah. This centre subsequently became the base for the Iranian Revolutionary 
Guards who were dispatched there.124 At these centres of religious studies, many of those who 
later became the leadership of Hizballah were students, and as Hassan Nasrallah, the current 
Secretary-General of the party said when eulogizing Fadlallah, ‘We were all his students.’125 
Another important point here is Fadlallah’s association with Ḥizb al-Daʿwa al-ʾIslāmiyya, 
where his friend Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr was actively involved from the beginning. As for 
his relationship to the Daʿwa party, the nature of it is not very clear. What is clear is the close 
connection between al-Sadr and Fadlallah, and Sankari describes his relation to the Daʿwa 
party as close and informal, while others claim that he was a member there.126 There can be 
no doubt that it must have been a very close relationship – I remember that the only picture on 
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the walls of Fadlallah’s reception room was a photo of al-Sadr. Another indication of this is 
the fact that Nūri al-Mālikī, Daʿwa member and Prime Minister of Iraq, came to Lebanon on a 
private visit a few days after the death of Fadlallah to give his condolences to the family.127 
This party was one of the components that later formed Hizballah, together with other groups, 
some of whom Fadlallah also wielded an influence on. 
As for the relationship between Fadlallah and Khomeini, it is no secret that the former was an 
admirer of the latter. He travelled frequently to Iran together with other Shiite activists, and 
met with Khomeini.128 It is at one of these meetings that Khomeini urged his followers in 
Lebanon to return and establish a true, Islamic organization.129 This particular meeting took 
place in conjunction with a conference in Teheran in support for the downtrodden of the 
world, and coincided with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Present were most of those 
who formed the initial leadership of the party, and Fadlallah. 
Another very important factor in this relationship, and something that is by and large 
overlooked by scholars doing research in this field, is that it was Khomeini himself who 
bestowed upon Fadlallah the rank of Ayatollah. This happened at a meeting at Khomeini’s 
residence in Teheran in 1986 at which a new constitution for an ‘Islamic Republic in 
Lebanon’ was drawn up, a meeting supposedly attended by Muhammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn 
as well. While Fadlallah has denied having any role in the drawing up of this constitution, he 
has confirmed that he was indeed given the rank of Ayatollah by Khomeini in Teheran in 
1986.130 The accuracy of the story of Fadlallah being involved in the actual drawing up of this 
constitution might be difficult to discern but he did endorse an Islamic state in Lebanon in a 
survey conducted in 1986.131 
 
7.3.1 Controversies in the relationship 
The controversies between Fadlallah and the party came after the death of Khomeini and at 
first centred around the question of the marjiʿiyya. Al-Khūʿī, the Najaf-based marjiʿ who 
Fadlallah had been the representative (wakīl ) for in Lebanon, died shortly after Khomeini. 
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While the party followed the Iranian leadership, who chose to follow the 100 year old 
Ayatollah al-Arākī before Khamenei was declared marjiʿ, Fadlallah chose to follow al-
Sistani, who al-Khūʿī had pointed to as his successor, before Fadlallah became a marjiʿ 
himself in 1995. Although this is not stated clearly anywhere, I would assume that one of the 
main reasons for not following Khamenei was that he was at the time widely criticized for 
lacking the scholarly qualifications to hold this post. One should bear in mind that at 
Khomeini’s death, Khamenei was not even an Ayatollah, but in the course of just a few years 
he reached the level of Grand Ayatollah, which would have been impossible for any serious 
mujtahid to endorse. 
Another controversy, which might seem unimportant but nevertheless caused a stir, occurred 
around the same time. This was a disagreement with a Lebanese-born Iranian-based shaykh 
over an historically important episode involving Fatima, the daughter of the Prophet. The 
episode is important because it is one of the main sources of Shiite grievances against Sunnis, 
and Fadlallah, as a promoter of Muslim unity and rapprochement between Sunnis and Shiites, 
tried to interpret what had happened in a new way. This interpretation was met with a fierce 
attack from Shaykh al-ʿĀmilī, accusing Fadlallah of weakening the Shiite community and 
seeking to destroy it from within. This led to a deterioration in the relationship between the 
Iranian leadership and Fadlallah, which also affected his relationship with Hizballah. These 
ties were however mended quite quickly, none of the two having any interest in a split within 
the Lebanese Shiite community, and this had after all been a controversy over a fourteen 
hundred year old episode. Besides, on the fundamental issues for both parties, they were in 
complete agreement. 
 
7.3.2 A fundamental agreement on two key issues 
This leads us to two key points for understanding Fadlallah’s stances and his relationship with 
Hizballah: (1) His view of Iran and (2) the views he holds on the Islamic Resistance.  
As I argued above, Fadlallah not only supported but was also directly involved in establishing 
the Islamic Resistance, which is the armed wing of Hizballah. This support continued 
uninterrupted, even in the period where there were differences between the two. At a Friday 
sermon he delivered in his mosque in June 2009, Fadlallah stated ‘There is nothing left in 
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front of the Lebanese but to react with dependence on the resistance, which should not under 
any circumstance be turned into a contest, after it became clear that it is the deterrent force 
which exposed the enemy and forced it to accept failure and defeat.’132 This is of course but 
one example of his unwavering support for the Islamic Resistance, nor is it controversial in 
the sense that his support for it is so clearly stated that it has never become a subject of 
disagreement.  
This stance means that Fadlallah was urging all the Lebanese to support a resistance which is 
founded on Shiite religious principles, led by Shiite clergy and which has made it very clear 
that it will not open up for the participation of other groups, nor will it put its arms under the 
control of the state.133 
Here it is also worth mentioning Fadlallah’s readings of what happened in Beirut on 7 May, 
2008, when Hizballah, through the resistance and its allies, took over west Beirut and parts of 
the Shouf mountains. ‘I think there are mistakes, starting from the government, then these 
mistakes moved to the display inside Beirut, the government should have noticed the 
involvement, present and well known in Lebanon, of the Resistance. It was said the Prime 
Minister did not agree on the two decisions, and that there were pressures put on him from 
some ministers, but the way the question was administered could not have led to anything but 
what resembles May 7, and I think that what happened on May 7 needs a deeper examination 
of the nature of the situation that happened on the one side, and the nature of the Lebanese 
sensitivities on the other hand.’134 This statement is difficult to read in another way than that 
he is making the government responsible for the armed takeover of west Beirut by the 
resistance, which he does not blame in any way for using its arms to achieve political gains 
vis-a-vis their opponents on the domestic political stage. 
7.3.3 The Islamic Republic 
As with the question of the Islamic Resistance, the stances of Fadlallah concerning the 
Islamic Republic of Iran have been consistent over the years, from the Revolution till his 
death. It is one thing to support Iran against an attack or to support its right to use nuclear 
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energy for peaceful purposes; it is another is to support it as the Islamic Republic. This is also 
linked with Fadlallah’s stance on the question of wilāyat al-faqīh. 
Again I will use the abovementioned Friday sermon to highlight Fadlallah’s stance, and a 
special consideration should be given to the wording he used. The sermon was given after the 
Iranian presidential elections on 12 June, 2009. He opened by ‘calling on the Arab regimes to 
consider the public display in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its popular vigour, to which 
there is no analogue in the whole world, even when this vigour is exposed to some 
negativities or when it is tarnished by some confusion by way of the freedom which the 
regime increased, through which the people could express themselves clearly and 
transparently before the elections and after them... and we send to this free and proud people 
the greetings of Islam... with the spirit of guarding this blessed revolution which brought 
down the peacock of America and the Zionists in the area and made Iran the foremost 
supporter of liberation movements and resistance fractions in the world... this state which 
represented the true extension of original Muhammadan Islamic line, which put the fear in the 
heart of the enemy of the nation, al-ʾumma, and especially the Zionist entity.’135 
The expression above to describe the ‘true’ Islam is interesting, as this is exactly the same 
expression used by Hizballah to describe what they contend is the ‘true’ Islam. Shaykh Ḥasan 
Ḥamāda, who is one of many clerics in the leadership of the party, uses the expression ‘the 
original Muhammadan Islam’ when describing what the party believes in.136 
From the above it should be clear that Fadlallah’s support for Iran was based on the fact that 
he considered it to represent ‘true Islam’, not that it is merely a friendly state, like Syria.  
In another statement from his office, released after a visit by an Iranian delegation in 
December 2009, he comments on the developments there: ‘The Islamic Republic in Iran is 
passing through a very critical period , marḥala daqīqa, and any effort to weaken it represents 
a service to the project of the oppressor, al-istikbār, which the Zionists stand behind.’137 
 
7.3.4  Fadlallah and wilāyat al-faqīh 
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This brings us to the question of Khomeini’s doctrine of wilāyat al-faqīh, of which Fadlallah 
was known to have an independent view. Based on the expressions above about the Islamic 
Republic representing the true Islam, I asked him about how these should be understood, 
given that he had previously held an independent view of this doctrine. The answer was in 
many ways atypical for Fadlallah, as it was very ambiguous. ‘I still hold an independent view 
on this theory , fikra, and I do not consider it to be part of the article of faith, al-ʿaqīda, it is a 
question that should be left to be discussed by the fuqahāʾ.’138 Given that Fadlallah himself 
was a senior faqīh, I would have found it natural to be given a more precise point of view on 
this important question. Another participant in the meeting asked him again, very politely, 
saying that he found the answer a bit unclear and requested that he elaborate. He did, but this 
time even more vaguely than the first time, saying that this question should be studied in 
detail based on the Iranian experience, while refusing to give any judgement based on what is 
brought forth by the Western press, which demonstrated during the war on Gaza that it was 
not trustworthy, calling on us who were present to wait for the legal treatment of the 
question.139 
His biographer claims that Fadlallah, from the Islamic Revolution and onwards, supported the 
idea of wilāyat al-faqīh, as the political activist he was. Even though he was the wakīl of al-
Khūʿī, who did not support this idea at all, Fadlallah made a distinction between al-Khūʿī’s 
absolute supremacy in religious and juridical matters and Khomeini’s supremacy in political 
leadership and organization.140As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, this is the same 
distinction Hizballah itself make, a distinction between the taqlīd of another marjiʿ and 
submitting to the supreme political leadership of the wālī al-faqīh.141 
 
7.3.5 An alternative to Hizballah? 
Given what I have demonstrated above, it seems strange to construct a major difference 
between Fadlallah on the one hand, and Iran and Hizballah on the other. There are several 
issues to consider here, the first one is what has been pointed out to me repeatedly by people 
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at different levels of Fadlallah’s organization: he did not have a political party. While he 
definitely had a political agenda, he himself never had his own party, and so his followers, if 
they wanted to engage in party politics, would join another party, i.e. Hizballah.142 
Another issue is the constructed divide between the Arabian and the Persian. While there are 
differences in religious practice, I am not sure these could be made on the ethnic basis of Arab 
versus Persian. Shaery-Eisenlohr refers to some criticism Fadlallah made against certain 
Iranians for claiming that Iran is the headquarters of Shiism143 but as should be evident from 
the examples above, Fadlallah himself considers the Islamic Republic to represent the 
political embodiment of the same Islam he defines himself as belonging to. While there were 
differences over the years between him and Iranian scholars, this should not necessarily be 
taken to mean that Fadlallah represented another trend in Shiite Islam.  
Shaery-Eisenlohr argues that what Fadlallah was doing was to establish an Arab nationalist 
Islamism as opposed to an Iranian one,144 but again I think that this should be viewed in 
another light. Al-ʿurūba, ‘Arabism’, was traditionally associated with left-wing and secular 
parties, in Lebanon as much as anywhere else. Instead of looking at Fadlallah’s embracing of 
Arabism as a way to distance himself from Iran, one should rather look at this as a way of 
claiming that there is no opposition between Islam and Arabism- On the contrary, according 
to Fadlallah these are tightly knit together. By claiming this, Fadlallah could reach out to 
sections of the Lebanese who saw Arabism as a pillar of their political outlook, thus also 
broadening his base of support, while at the same time undermining the monopoly the left 
wing had on this concept.  
A third argument put forth is that the Iranians are displaying exaggerated feelings in the 
performing of religious rituals, not least during ʿāshūrāʾ, commemorating the martyrdom of 
Imam Ḥusayn.145 This seems to be a rather strange argument, as both Fadlallah, Hizballah and 
Khamenei have issued fatāwā forbidding the tradition of self-flagellation, which many 
Lebanese Shiites are known to practise during the yearly procession in Nabatieh in south 
Lebanon. Here, this procession is commonly associated with the Amal movement and the 
participants in it consider this to be the authentic version of an ʿAshūrāʾ commemoration.146 
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Fadlallah wielded an enormous influence over the Islamist Shiite movement in Lebanon, and 
was instrumental in the formation of Hizballah, even though he was not directly involved in 
its organization. Shams al-Dīn, Hānī Faḥṣ and others were also important in that process but 
in the course of time these other clerics grew critical of Hizballah,147 while Fadlallah stood by 
it and always claimed that he and Hizballah were part of the same Islamic trend (ḥāla 
ʾislāmiyya). His support for the Islamic Resistance was unwavering, and the ones he 
considered as being the main enemy, America and Israel, are also the main enemies of the 
party. Even when it comes to language I found that it is much the same vocabulary that is 
used – the word for arrogant (al-ʾistikbār al-ʿālamī) when describing the Americans and the 
word used for the oppressed (al-mustaḍʿafūn) are but two examples of this. 
Some close associates of Fadlallah with whom I had long conversations claimed that his most 
important contribution to Hizballah was to moderate some of their more extreme views, such 
as those of forcing an Islamic republic on the Lebanese.148 In retrospect, a more precise way 
of putting it would be to say that what he did was to support those inside the party who  
favoured conciliatory language. Both the party and Fadlallah were critical of the Taif 
agreement, while he immediately supported Hizballah’s decision to participate in the elections 
in 1992. 
At the religious level there were differences, but these were minor. Even though Fadlallah 
was the representative of al-Khūʿī in Lebanon and did not have Khomeini as his marjiʿ, he 
respected the political leadership of the latter. He also considered the theory of wilāyat al-
faqīh to be theologically sound, even though he did not consider it to be an article of the faith. 
That he himself clamed the marjiʿiyya in the mid-nineties, and thus became a competitor to 
Khamenei, was at the time a source of friction between Hizballah and Fadlallah, but seen 
from his position it would have undermined his standing as a religious scholar to accept 
Khamenei as a source of emulation given his weak scholarly credentials. While Fadlallah’s 
own credentials were questioned by some, it became evident that he had the support of many 
Shiites in Lebanon, who took great pride in having a local as their marjiʿ. 
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Fadlallah clearly moved and operated within the confines of the hegemony of Hizballah and 
the differences on some minor points does not change this. He did this not because of pressure 
or other considerations, but because from the very outset there was a fundamental agreement 
between the two on all major issues. His position as a senior religious scholar and leader was 
of great importance for the party, as he was instrumental in expanding their religious and 
political legitimacy. His contributions in other fields, not least education and social services, 
also benefitted Hizballah on several levels. By educating ʿulamāʾ for over a generation, he 
helped expand the protelyzing of a radical, Shiite Islamism. Through his elementary, 
secondary and vocational schools, such as the one in Khiam, he reached wider than Hizballah 
did and thus contributed to attach more Shiites to his vision of Islam.  
Significantly, he succeeded in projecting himself as a moderating force that could help 
contain the most radical forces in the Islamic milieu Through his emphasis on dialogue and 
his willingness to talk to even American officials, he was seen as being open – and people or 
groups who had strained relations with Hizballah would talk with him.  
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8 Amal 
Amal could be viewed as an alternative to Hizballah for several reasons, the most important 
being that it does not have the same ideological foundation as Hizballah nor does it have an 
armed wing. Shaery-Eisenlohr argues that it represents a more genuine Lebanese Shiism 
while Hizballah represents an Iranian one.149 I argue that Amal has lost much of its previous 
influence, and that they operate within a framework created by Hizballah. Despite their 
religious differences, I will also refute the allegations that they represent a more genuinely 
Lebanese expression than Hizballah. 
This has much to do with the origins of Amal and its founder , Musa al-Sadr, being Iranian 
himself. It is true that he can easily trace his lineage back to Lebanon, but through his life he 
spoke Arabic with a heavy Persian accent and the same is true for his sister Rabab who today 
heads a charity foundation.150 There were also Iranians working with Mousa al-Sadr long 
before the Iranian Revolution, the most well-known of these being Mustafa Chamran, who 
became a minister after the Revolution.151 That the links between the movement and Iran are 
still strong, albeit on a different level than Hizballah, was evident during the visit of the then 
President Khatami to Lebanon in 2003. Khatami is married to the niece of Musa and Rabab 
al-Sadr, and he was given an extraordinary welcome when he arrived, not least by Amal 
leaders who were eager to point out this relationship. 
Although not a religious party like Hizballah, on the homepage of Amal one will find that 
they have Ali Sistani [ʿAlī al-Sīstānī] as their marjiʿ.152 Sistani is himself an Iranian, but he 
resides in Najaf, Iraq. This places Amal in the mainstream of world Shiism today, and does 
not make them more Lebanese in religious practices than Hizballah or other Lebanese Shiites. 
In Lebanon, Amal is associated with the Supreme Shiite Council (Majlis al-Shiʿī al-ʾAʿlā), set 
up by Musa al-Sadr in 1967 and today led by Abd al-Amir Qabalan [ʿAbd al-ʾAmīr 
Qabalān].153 This body appoints Shiite judges and muftis for the different Lebanese districts, 
and represents the Shiites officially; their Sunni counterpart is the Dār al-fatwā.  
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As explained earlier, it was the founder of Amal, Musa al-Sadr, who initiated the process of 
mobilizing the Lebanese Shiites socially and politically. Following his disappearance, Amal 
developed into an organization resembling the other Lebanese factions at the time. The new 
leader, Nabih Berri, did not have a religious background. He was a lawyer and a former 
member of the Baath Party.154 Following the Israeli invasion in 1982 he joined the other 
leaders in the so-called National Salvation Front (hayʾat al-ʾinqādh al-waṭanī) set up to 
negotiate with the Israelis on behalf of the Lebanese authorities. This was also the direct 
reason many Amal members left and joined the newly formed Hizballah.155 In common with 
other Lebanese armed groups during the civil war, Amal resorted to extortion to finance their 
warfare throughout the eighties.156 This period was also a period of rivalry between Hizballah 
and Amal, which started with the camps war in 1985.  This war was launched by Amal with 
strong Syrian backing against the Palestinian refugee camps, which Hizballah publicly 
criticized.157 The war was a prelude to the war between Amal and Hizballah over the control 
of the southern suburbs of Beirut, which led to the near destruction of Amal and gave 
Hizballah near complete control over the suburbs.158 
A new phase began with the end of the war in 1990. Amal, represented by Berri, was one of 
those who had negotiated the Taif agreement. In the elections of 1992 they formed an 
electoral alliance with Hizballah under Syrian supervision, an alliance that is still in place. 
Amal in the post-war period developed into a more or less regular political party, its 
resistance activities were taken over by Hizballah while Amal focused on parliamentarian 
work. They have had the speaker of parliament position all through this period and on this 
front they have been useful for Hizballah. With Syria being the main power-broker in 
Lebanon during this period, the influence of Amal on the parliamentary life in the country 
increased. Outside of parliament, their standing weakened as Hizballah expanded their 
cultural and military hegemony in Shiite Lebanon. Their resources cannot compete with those 
of Hizballah. Their main contribution comes from channelling money from the state through 
the Council of the South. The charities associated with Amal are also minor compared to 
those of Hizballah. 
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With the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon in 2006, Amal entered a new phase, and had to 
depend more on Hizballah than they had before. Both due to the Islamic Resistance and its 
work in civil society, Hizballah had the upper hand in this relationship. While things were 
smooth on the surface, it is clear that not everything was fine in their relationship. This 
became evident in the recent elections. Both Amal and Hizballah are part of the March 8 
alliance, and they now have to take Michel Aoun into consideration. For Amal, Aoun 
represents a competitor, much more than Hizballah. As shown above, Hizballah does not have 
parliamentary work as its main priority, thus they have never put an emphasis of having the 
largest number of MPs, unlike Amal and Aoun, who failed to present a joint list in Jezzin, 
where two Maronite and one Greek Catholic seats were up for grabs. It became evident during 
the campaign that personal relations between Aoun and Berri were not good at all. This was a 
challenge for Hizballah but they did not directly intervene – they have a long and tight 
relationship with Amal, while Michel Aoun represents a very valuable asset for the party too. 
The elections resulted in a victory for Aoun, whose list won all three seats.159 
The relationship between Amal and Hizballah is still close, despite such events as the one in 
Jezzin. Amal does not have any military capabilities of its own, and its economic resources 
are limited compared to those of Hizballah but they play an important role as an allied force 
in parliament, and they were instrumental in paralysing parliamentary work from 2007 to 
2008, as Berri in his capacity as speaker was the one who refused to convene the Parliament. 
During the May 2008 events they were also mobilized and took to the streets of west Beirut. 
They have never challenged Hizballah hegemony over Shiite Lebanon, rather they operate 
within it. To a certain degree they share the same origins as Hizballah, through the work of 
Musa al-Sadr, but they lack the strong ideological foundation of the party. This is an 
important part of the reason why Amal is not able or willing to challenge Hizballah’s 
hegemony over Shiite Lebanon. 
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9 Shiite critics of Hizballah  
Following the events in May 2008, when fighters from Hizballah and their allies in the Syrian 
National Social Party and Amal occupied west Beirut and the Shouf mountains, a new wave 
of criticism was launched against the party. There are two points of interest here, first that it 
was to a large degree other Shiites who were in the forefront of the criticism, and second that 
much of the criticism against the party took the form of criticism against the theory of wilāyat 
al-faqīh. I will concentrate on assessing some of this criticism offered by other Shiite 
intellectuals, and their main points of divergence from the party. The way criticism is dealt 
with is important to measure the success or failure of a hegemony. As I wrote in chapter 2.6, a 
strong hegemony would require a minimal use of violence to uphold it, while one of the signs 
of a weak hegemony is that more violence or other sanctions would be required to safeguard 
it. 
 
9.1 The case of Ali al-Amin [ʿAlī al-ʾAmīn] 
The case of Ali al-Amin is of interest, as it pitted an independent and outspoken cleric against 
the ‘establishment’ represented by the Supreme Shiite Council and its Vice-President shaykh 
Abd al-Amir Qabalan. As will be remembered, it was Musa al-Sadr who formed the Council, 
and it represents the Shiites vis-à-vis the state, which also finances many of its activities. One 
of the prerogatives of the Council is to appoint muftis for the different regions of the country 
where there is a Shiite presence, and Ali al-Amin was appointed  jaʿfarī mufti of Tyre in 
2002. Al-Amin had studied under Fadlallah and had spent ten years in Najaf followed by 
three years in Qum before returning to Lebanon, where he started to teach at the seminaries of 
Fadlallah.160 
Initially there was no controversy surrounding al-Amin. He was seen as being close to Amal, 
for which Tyre is a traditional stronghold. However, by 2004 there were reports about an 
increasingly strained relationship with Qabalan.161 Following the assassination of Hariri in 
2005, these differences seem to have increased, but it was in the aftermath of the July War in 
2006 that the mufti took an open stand against Hizballah, claiming that the war was against 
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the wishes of the Shiites in the south in general, saying ‘no-one authorized anyone to declare 
war in the name of the Shiites’.162 In the same interview he also criticized the Lebanese state 
and said that the war came as a result of a vacuum left in the south by the state who had 
relinquished its duty to defend the region and its citizens.163 
After the takeover of Beirut and parts of the mountains by Hizballah and its allies in May 
2008, the conflict exploded and the controversies between Qabalan and al-Amin came out 
into the open. Qabalan called the decision from the government that sparked the takeover a 
declaration of war against the Islamic Resistance, while al-Amin lambasted the party and its 
actions. The Lebanese paper al-Nahār published letters issued by the Higher Shiite Council in 
which al-Amin was formally deposed from his post as mufti of Tyre, as well as the reply from 
al-Amin.164 He had already been forced to leave his house in the city because a mob of several 
hundred had attacked his house. Al-Amin himself said that he recognized several of the 
perpetrators as they were former students of his, and claimed that they belonged to Amal.165 
The first letter sent to al-Amin from the Council was in the form of a long list of grievances 
and accusations against al-Amin, such as the lack of reporting about the state of affairs among 
the Shiites in the area, accusing him of using his time to meet politicians and journalists and 
writing political articles for publication in the press and expressing himself on behalf of the 
Shiites. The letter ends with al-Amin being given a week to present a defence against the 
accusations.166 
In the reply from al-Amin to Qabalan, he said that he was following the same position that he 
has taken since the eighties, and that he had striven to ‘…protect the interest of the Shiite sect, 
to whom [he does] not see any interest for outside the interest of the Lebanese homeland and 
coexistence with the remaining Lebanese sects, and the erection of the State of institutions 
and law, which forms the protection and the safeguarding for all the Lebanese’. He continues, 
‘It is not in the interest of the south and its population that its territory should remain a field 
for open warfare and a launching pad for rockets...’167 
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On several occasions both before and after his eviction from Tyre, al-Amin has been very 
critical of the wilāyat al-faqīh theory, and he thus follows the main trend of criticism coming 
from other Shiites. Like them he links this theory to Iran, thus questioning the loyalty of 
Hizballah to Lebanon and the Lebanese state.  
 
9.2 Other critics 
Another well known critic of Hizballah was the former President of the Supreme Shiite 
Council, Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, who died in 2001. A senior cleric, who spent over 
thirty years studying in Najaf, he co-founded the Supreme Council with Musa al-Sadr and 
following the latter’s disappearance in Libya, he was elected President of the Council in 1984. 
His testimony (waṣāyā ),168 which he wrote shortly before his death in 2001, is a very 
important document in that it gives a different vision of Lebanon than the one conveyed by 
Hizballah. The first paragraph is a call on all Shiites in the world to assimilate into their 
various communities and homelands and not to create any particularistic project setting them 
apart from others.169 This is a clear critique against anyone who talks about erecting an 
Islamic order or state, but also to those who create political party blocks (takattulāt ḥizbiyya 
siyāsiyya) on a Shiite basis.170 He goes further in this direction, warning against removing the 
the system of representation on the basis of sectarian identity.  
His son Ibrahim continued the path of his father and became a member of the unity 
government formed after the Doha agreement. In the aftermath of the events of May 2008 he 
was one of many intellectual Shiites who criticized Hizballah for their actions. His initial 
remarks were a citation of his father, that the Shiites should not have any projects outside the 
framework of the state, but it is the critique of wilayat al-faqih that is the fundament of his 
grievances against Hizballah. He goes right to the core when asking the question about the 
legitimacy of power: does it belong to God or humans? In the view of those who believe in 
the legality of wilāyat al-faqīh it belongs to God, represented by the walī, who is not elected 
by the people, and whose power extends to Shiites all over the world. Shams al-Din refutes 
the legality of this system, and warns that the project of Hizballah remains to establish an 
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Islamic republic in Lebanon. He claims that what Hizballah did by taking to the streets and 
using their arms constitutes a revolt against the state, forcing upon others their views and 
disrespecting the institutions of the state. He also voices his criticism against Hassan 
Nasrallah personally, who had claimed in a previous speech that he respected pluralism and 
participation, asking rhetorically, ‘Where was that participation on May 8?’ Against this he 
advocates the strengthening of the state and the rule of parliamentary democracy, calling on 
the Shiites to make their political project a part of a complementary project of the state they 
belong to.171 
Another critic is Saud al-Mawla, who is associate professor in sociology at the Lebanese 
University. In a special edition of the Egyptian magazine Al-Hilāl in October 2008 called 
Dawlat Ḥizb Allāh fī Lubnān, he wrote a long article about the party. Here he claims that 
Hizballah was formed as a branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon,172 and 
cites Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid as saying that the faqīh (Khomeini) is the only one who 
Hizballah rely on in taking political decisions, as the prerogatives of the faqīh knows no 
borders.173 Al-Mawla worked with Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din for a long period, and 
cites the latter for having said that even the name Hizballah is unacceptable. If one group 
belongs to Hizballah it must mean that the others belong to Ḥizb al-Shayṭān, the Party of the 
Devil. This way of defining the people is unacceptable; he again cites Shams al-Din for 
saying that even the use of the name of God in a political party is refused.174 In a conversation 
I had with al-Mawla he repeated his critique of Hizballah for behaving in a totalitarian way 
and monopolizing the voice of the Shiites. For him the actions taken by the party in May 2008 
conveyed their true face: what they cannot achieve by other means they will use their 
weapons to achieve.175 
9.3 Hizballah’s response 
The response on part of Hizballah to these critics took different forms. While al-Amin was 
physically threatened and driven out of his home, none of the others has experienced this. 
According to al-Amin it was followers of Amal who attacked him, but both Hizballah and 
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Amal refrained from issuing any comments on the issue. His case shows how the Shiite 
establishment and allies of the party move to curb critics of Hizballah, because it was not the 
Supreme Council or Amal that was criticized by al-Amin, it was Hizballah. Unlike the others, 
he held a position which could have been used to gather support for his views among 
Lebanese Shiites. To give any legitimacy to a senior Shiite cleric who opposes their views 
would be more dangerous for Hizballah’s legitimacy than independent academics voicing 
their criticism. They do not have an apparatus backing them, nor are they actively involved in 
party politics.176 They all challenge the picture Hizballah conveys of representing the Shiite 
voice, but they are marginal on the stage of national Shiite politics and it is highly unlikely 
that any of them, al-Amin included, would constitute a threat to Hizballah’s position. The 
same can be said of other Shiite groups, like the Lebanese Option Group led by ʾAḥmad al-
ʾAsad or the Free Shiite Movement led by Muḥammad al-Ḥājj Ḥasan.  
 
 
                                               
176
 Ibrahim Shams al-Din was a member of the government, not an MP, and he was picked by the President, not 
by a party. 
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10 Conclusion 
 
Having conducted my fieldwork in Khiam with the Mabarrat, and obtaining valuable 
information and insights from all the people I met there and in neighbouring villages, and 
compared this information with the situation of the Shiites on a national level, a picture is 
starting to emerge. 
This is a picture of a major Shiite trend comprised of many separate actors who together work 
within a common, agreed framework, which has some rules that are not to be broken. The 
most important of these rules is the absolute sanctity of the weapons of the Islamic 
Resistance, and the acceptance by these actors that it is the Islamic Resistance that is the 
defender of the territory and the facilitator of a framework providing social security for the 
population. It is not Hizballah who is the sole provider of the needs of the population when it 
comes to other fields, like education or health services. This is where the other, non-armed 
groups, parties, and charities have their place. Together, these groups are striving to fill the 
vacuum left by the largely absent state, but a clear condition is the acceptance of the 
framework of the resistance. Different groups complement each other in this field, even 
though they in some ways compete for the same resources in the form of gifts, contributions, 
religious taxes and the like. Despite the lack of a formal framework for cooperation and 
coordination, they put an emphasis on not competing with each other, at least not openly. So 
when the Mabarrat has a school in the town, the ʿIsā bin Maryam School, this would mean 
that Hizballah is not in a great hurry to establish one of their Mahdī schools in the same town. 
This is also true for mosques: Fadlallah does not have his own mosque in the town, and his 
followers go to one of the other mosques to pray. 
Another factor is the position of political opponents, that is, those groups who do not belong 
to the March 8 camp. While I was in Khiam, I could not detect any presence of these groups, 
and when I asked my contacts and sources about this, they would say that no-one there 
supported these groups and that is why they are not present. In neighbouring villages which 
did not have a majority Shiite population, like Ibl al-Saqi where I stayed, these had a visible 
presence, together with groups from the Mach 8 camp, like the Free Patriotic Movement of 
Michel Aoun. Only later did I learn that at least one of these groups in opposition to 
Hizballah, the so called Lebanese Option Group lead by ʾAḥmad al-ʾAsad, were present in 
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Khiam. This came to my notice as newspapers reported about yet another attack against this 
group by unknown assailants, where for the second time the group’s representative in Khiam 
had his car blown up. 
The rules which I referred to earlier, as put forth by the so-called Committee for the 
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice in the early nineties, preventing the sale of 
alcohol, noisy parties and so on, is by and large observed in Khiam, with the exception of 
enforcing women to wear the hijab. As for the youths of Khiam, they would visit the 
neighbouring towns and villages such as Marjayoun or Ibl to drink, but even this has largely 
stopped now, according to restaurant owners I spoke to in Ibl. The shift came following the 
war in 2006, they claim. Before that it was not uncommon at all for the youths of Khiam to 
visit. Even then troubles would often arise when more or less drunk youths started singing 
songs in support of the Islamic Resistance or shout insults against leaders like al-Hariri and 
Walid Joumblat.  
Another point of great importance is how the towns and villages are treated and viewed by the 
Shiites themselves. When I set out to do my fieldwork, I asked the Mabarrat if it would be 
possible for me to do my fieldwork in a small, Shiite village in the South where Fadlallah had 
some kind of presence. Only later did I notice the churches in the town, and when I asked my 
contacts about whether Khiam was actually a mixed Christian and Muslim town, they would 
confirm that. Most, if not all, Christians had left the town, but some would come in the 
weekends and holidays, like other migrants and emigrants, either from Beirut or from abroad. 
The interesting here is that the town was obviously viewed as Shiite, despite the presence of 
Christians, and as such, the rules mentioned above were enforced.  
These findings correspond to the results of my analysis of the situation of the Shiites on a 
national level. The groups representing the community on a national level, both political ones 
like Hizballah and Amal, and religious like Fadlallah and the Higher Shiite Council operate 
within the same common framework. Again the overriding principle is the sanctity of the 
weapons of the Islamic Resistance, and, as on the local level, the different groups operate a 
number of schools, hospitals, social charities and mosques. On this level there is an important 
factor not to be missed: the funding from the Lebanese state to different projects in the South 
is channelled through the so-called Council for the South, which is headed by Nabih Berri. 
The other groups, with the exception of the Higher Shiite Council, which is also state-funded, 
relies on other sources for their funding. The operations run by Hizballah, including the 
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Islamic Resistance, are largely funded by Iran or with Iranian assistance, for example the 
Martyr’s Foundation (Muʾassasat al-Shahīd) is a branch of an Iranian foundation. Another 
indirect, assisted way of funding is religious taxes, both the zakāt and the khums, which are 
collected from those who follow Khamenei as their marjiʿ. These taxes are spent in Lebanon, 
with permission from Khamenei, and are an important source of income. This has enabled 
Hizballah to establish an impressive structure for providing for the needs of its constituency, 
from the cradle to the grave, to a far larger extent than the rest of the other groups combined. 
They have managed this not least due to a solid ideological foundation, and by reading the 
shifting political situations cleverly. The wilāyat al-faqīh doctrine has proved flexible enough 
to allow for this. During the civil war the focus was on a military modus operandi. Not just 
concerning the fight against Israel, but also on gaining control over Shiite areas of Lebanon. 
With the end of the civil war Hizballah managed to continue its fight against Israel militarily, 
not least due to their participation in the Lebanese parliamentarian system. However, their 
strategy towards Shiite civil society is perhaps the most important factor for their success, 
where they have managed to turn the focus on the Islamic Resistance into a culture of 
resistance. The Islamic Resistance is viewed by Lebanese Shiites as representing them, and 
criticism against it is viewed as criticism against the Shiites. Thus the most important 
condition for establishing a hegemony is fulfilled, as the Shiite population in Lebanon view 
Hizballah’s position as a necessity.  
Concerning the other areas of Lebanon with a majority of Shiite inhabitants, like the southern 
suburbs of Beirut and parts of the Bekaa valley, the same rules seem to apply for those as for 
Khiam. It is the party that is in charge of security, but other groups are also present. As in 
Khiam, there is no open presence of groups opposed to the hegemony of Hizballah, these 
groups or individuals are actively opposed, like in the case of ʾAḥmad al-ʾAsad, or actively 
ignored as in the case of Ibrahim Shams ad-Din and others. These people usually do not live 
in areas under the party’s control, thus they are able to speak relatively freely, but by the same 
token none of them constitute a direct threat to Hizballah, as they are not organized or armed, 
and their resources are relatively limited. 
If we compare this to the theory of hegemony as I outlined in chapter 2.6, I argue that 
Hizballah has managed to establish a hegmony over Shiite civil society. The rules of conduct 
they put forth is by and large observed, and their position as the main provider of services to 
this community is unchallenged. While other organizations also provide services to the 
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Lebanese Shiites, none of these challenges the position of the party. Rather they operate 
within the framework of this hegemony. Through a strong ideological foundation, Hizballah 
has managed to get this society to accept their interests as the common interests of the 
community. This is not least evident when it comes to the Islamic Resistance, which is seen as 
the protector of the community. However, here it is also evident that the party has not been 
able to extend this hegemony to other sections of Lebanese society, as large parts of the 
population do not view the Islamic Resistance as their protectors, and would prefer that 
Hizballah’s weapons be put under the command of the Lebanese state. 
On the economic level, Hizballah has, through its access to resources from both abroad and 
Lebanon, managed to strengthen its position as the hegemonic force in Shiite Lebanon. The 
party has never sought to be a dominant force in the business life of this community, rather it 
has wanted to prevent other forces from using economic power to challenge its position. It has 
succeeded in this with regard to the Shiite community, but not with regard to Lebanon. There 
are many wealthy businessmen who oppose their position, not least Saʿd al-Ḥarīrī, the current 
Sunni Prime Minister. 
While the party has not been able to extend its hegemony to the rest of Lebanon in civil 
society and on the economic level, it has managed to enforce its hegemony militarily. It has 
been able to do this due to the hegemony it holds over Shiite Lebanon, which has given them 
a solid base to expand from. This is also the main priority for Hizballah, and this is also their 
greatest success. While not at all accepted by Lebanese society at large, it is a fact that the 
party occupies a position in which it can impose its views through the use of force. This 
became evident during the events of May 2008. 
Those events could be seen as an expression of a weakened hegemony, i.e. resorting to the 
use of force to uphold a hegemony would indicate that – but this should not be viewed as a 
step to uphold a hegemony over Shiite Lebanon, it is rather a step to strengthen the military 
hegemony over the whole of Lebanon. In the eyes of Hizballah and their allies, the Islamic 
Resistance has become the Lebanese defence force. This is expressed plainly by their ally 
Michel Aoun, who said that the weapons of the Islamic Resistance should be used to face 
Israel and those of the Army to prevent internal problems.177 While resolution 1701 put some 
pressure on the Islamic Resistance and forced them north of the Litani River (operating 
undercover south of the river), it has on the other hand led to an expansion of their areas of 
                                               
177
 Lebanon Now 21.April 2010. 
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operation. This became evident when fighters from Hizballah shot down a Lebanese Army 
helicopter in the Sojoud area, claiming that they mistook it for an Israeli one. 
It might be that the best expression of how the Shiites view their own position came in a 
conversation with some people working with Fadlallah in the South. In response to my 
question about how they viewed the Lebanese state, one of them said: ‘We don’t have a state 
here: we have our state here, the State of Hizballah!’ Well aware that this statement 
contradicts the official policy of both Fadlallah and Hizballah, I asked if I could record the 
answer. She said that was okay, but was cut off by one of the others present, who said: 
‘Record this: it’s not a state, it’s an empire and Sayyid Hassan [Nasrallah] is the emperor!’ 
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